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ABSTRACT 
 Through a collection of three integrated essays, this dissertation investigates how 
institutional logics shape the way firms and their decision makers perceive, interpret, and 
respond to political connectedness. More specifically, it elaborates on the cognitive 
mechanisms through which institutional logics affect responses to political 
connectedness. Essay 1 provides a fresh perspective to studying political connectedness 
by showing how the differences in the interplay between multiple institutional logics 
generate opposing logics – bureaucratic logic in developed countries vs. patrimonial logic 
in emerging countries –, which lead to two dissimilar forms of firm-government 
interaction across countries. Essay 2 proposes a new conceptual framework, institutional 
sensemaking, which I develop by building on the institutional logics and sensemaking 
literatures. This framework is used to investigate how bureaucratic logic and patrimonial 
logic differently shape the way the expatriate managers make sense of and respond to 
political connectedness in China. Essay 3 examines how managerial sensemaking affects 
firms’ responses to dissimilar logics of firm-government interaction by looking at the 
relationship between managers’ attention focus and their internationalization choices 
regarding whether to expand into developed countries – where bureaucratic logic prevails 
– or into emerging countries – where patrimonial logic prevails.  
  
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION ....................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................ iv 
ABSTRACT  ............................................................................................................................v 
LIST OF TABLES  ............................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................. ix 
CHAPTER 1: OVERVIEW  ........................................................................................................1 
 1.1 ESSAY 1  ................................................................................................................1 
 1.2 ESSAY 2  ................................................................................................................2 
 1.3 ESSAY 3  ................................................................................................................5 
CHAPTER 2: WHAT IS THE LOGIC BEHIND POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS?  ............................9 
 2.1 INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS  ......................................................................................12 
 2.2 LEGITIMACY OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN FIRMS AND GOVERNMENTS  ..................25 
 2.3 THE LOGIC BEHIND POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS  ..............................................32 
 2.4 VARIETIES OF FIRM-GOVERNMENT INTERACTIONS  ............................................35 
 2.5 DISCUSSION  ........................................................................................................38 
 2.6 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................43 
CHAPTER 3: MAKING SENSE OF POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS:  
CORRUPTION OR STRATEGY? ..............................................................................................51 
 3.1 MOTIVATION .......................................................................................................51 
 3.2 LITERATURE REVIEW ..........................................................................................54 
vii 
 3.3 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ..............................................................................56 
3.4 DECONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LITERATURE ON  
POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS BY USING THE INSTITUTIONAL SENSEMAKING 
FRAMEWORK .............................................................................................................60 
  
 3.5 METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................62 
 3.6 CONTENT ANALYSIS ............................................................................................64 
 3.7 BLENDING DISSIMILAR LOGICS OF FIRM-GOVERNMENT INTERACTION ...............67 
 3.8 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................71 
 3.9 DISCUSSION .........................................................................................................72 
CHAPTER 4: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS, MANAGERIAL SENSEMAKING, AND 
INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGY: MANAGERIAL ATTENTION AS THE COGNITIVE 
UNDERPINNING OF FIRM’S STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO DISSIMILAR INSTITUTIONAL  
LOGICS OF FIRM-GOVERNMENT INTERACTION ...................................................................85 
 
 4.1 INTERNATIONALIZATION AS A STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO  
 DISSIMILAR INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS .........................................................................88 
 4.2 MANAGERIAL ATTENTION ...................................................................................91 
 4.3 HYPOTHESES .......................................................................................................92 
 4.4 METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................96 
 4.5 RESULTS ............................................................................................................102 
 4.6 DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................104 
 4.7 IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH ..........................................................106 
 4.8 CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................106 
REFERENCES .....................................................................................................................112  
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1 Dissertation overview ..........................................................................................8 
Table 2.1 Institutional orders that shape firm-government interaction ..............................45 
Table 2.2 Institutional logics and corresponding remedies for corruption………………46 
 
Table 2.3 Varieties of firm-government interactions .........................................................47 
Table 2.4 Blends of logics across countries .......................................................................48 
Table 3.1 Two perspectives on political connectedness ....................................................77 
Table 3.2 Institutional sensemaking of political connectedness ........................................78 
Table 3.3 Sample of expatriate managers by location, industry, and nationality ..............79 
Table 3.4 Sample sentences used for coding .....................................................................80 
Table 4.1 Firm’s external environment ............................................................................107 
Table 4.2 Global industries in which sampled firms operate ...........................................108 
Table 4.3 Samples of keywords used for automated coding ...........................................109 
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics and correlations..............................................................110 
Table 4.5 Results of analyses of managerial attention focus on  
internationalization choices .............................................................................................111 
  
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1 Cross-level model of institutional logics ..........................................................49 
Figure 2.2 Interplay among institutional logics across countries………………………..50 
Figure 3.1 Micro-level model of sensemaking ..................................................................81 
Figure 3.2 Cross-level model of institutional sensemaking ...............................................82 
Figure 3.3 Model of institutional sensemaking of political connectedness .......................83 
Figure 3.4 Blend of patrimonial logic and bureaucratic logic ...........................................84
 1 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW 
 
My dissertation is organized as a collection of three integrated essays. Each of the three 
essays has been developed to make contributions both to the institutional frameworks 
used in international business and to our understanding of the international business 
phenomena in emerging countries. Essay 1 is a perspective paper that proposes a new 
lens to study political connectedness by drawing on the institutional logics perspective. 
Essay 2 is a qualitative paper that develops the theory of institutional sensemaking of 
political connectedness by integrating the institutional logics framework and the tripartite 
sensemaking framework with the insights that I gained into the political connectedness 
phenomenon during my field research in China. Essay 3 is an empirical paper that 
examines the relationship between managerial sensemaking and firm’s strategic 
responses to political connectedness through an analysis of panel data. Overall, my 
dissertation comprises a new theoretical framework and two unique datasets: one 
longitudinal and one cross-sectional obtained through interviews. Both of these datasets 
have great potential to be used in numerous future studies.
 
1.1 Essay 1 
 In the first essay, entitled, What is the logic behind political connectedness?,  I 
explore the political connectedness phenomena in emerging countries by reviewing the 
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concerning international business research from an institutional logics perspective, by 
which I identify the prevailing logics that shape firm-government interaction in 
developed and emerging countries. In line with the extant international business research, 
I conclude that prevailing logics in emerging countries and those in developed countries 
are not different in degree, but rather different in kind (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Then I 
build on the institutional logics perspective to provide a new perspective to studying 
differences in firm-government interaction across countries. In this regard, I argue that 
patrimonial logic is generated when weak logics of the market and the state blend with 
the strong logics of the family and the community, which results in the prevalence of 
patronage ties between firms and governments. Such patrimonial logic and the 
consequent patronage ties exist in emerging countries to various extents. In developed 
countries, on the other hand, market logic and state logic dominate the institutional 
system, “insulating” the domain of firm-government relations against the logics of the 
family and the community. This results in bureaucratic logic, which leads to the 
prevalence of rule-based, impersonal exchanges between firms and governments.  This 
essay contributes to the international business literature on corruption, a deconstruction of 
which in the essay reveals that our knowledge of firm-government interaction is to a large 
extent shaped by Western bureaucratic logic, and hence fails to explain such a non-
Western phenomenon as political connectedness (Tsui, 2007).    
 
1.2 Essay 2 
In the second essay, entitled, Making sense of political connectedness: Corruption 
or strategy?, I examine how institutional logics draw the boundary that separates 
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legitimate exchanges between firms and governments from illegitimate ones. More 
specifically, the essay shows how different institutional logics differently shape the way 
managers make sense of and respond to political connectedness by integrating the 
institutional logics framework and the tripartite sensemaking framework with the insights 
gained into the political connectedness phenomenon in China through field research. In 
this regard, I argue that under bureaucratic logic, managerial attention will be directed to 
the legal and moral aspects of political connectedness. As a result, political 
connectedness will be framed in negative terms, and managers will try to avoid political 
connectedness. Under patrimonial logic, on the other hand, managerial attention will be 
directed to the economic and relational aspects of political connectedness. As a result, 
political connectedness will be framed in positive terms, and managers will try to 
increase political connectedness.  
Further, my field research in China shows that some expatriate managers have 
actually been able to navigate in the Chinese institutional system by developing cognitive 
complexity, which enables them not only to learn the patrimonial logic prevalent in their 
host country, but also to blend it with the bureaucratic logic prevalent in their home 
country. The consequent hybrid logic directs these managers’ attention to both legal and 
moral aspects of political connectedness. As a result, they frame political connectedness 
both in positive and in negative terms. In other words, those expatriate managers make 
sense of political connectedness as a double-edged sword. In this regard, they find 
political connectedness to be essential in order to operate in the Chinese institutional 
system, and they do not think of it necessarily as corruption. However, they believe it can 
turn into corruption depending on the nature of the political ties and on the way these ties 
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are utilized. Therefore, although these managers essentially seek to increase political 
connectedness to gain economic benefits in China, they avoid engaging in practices that 
are blatantly illegal and blatantly immoral in their home country. In other words, 
although they do not want to commit to the white area, at the same time they want to 
avoid the black area. Thus, they end up navigating in the Chinese institutional system by 
operating in the gray area, in which they find a balance between the two dissimilar logics.              
 
1.2.1 Methodology 
In the field research, I conducted interviews on expatriate managers in China, who 
were all from countries in which bureaucratic logic is prevalent. In order to prompt 
participants to talk such a sensitive topic as and political connectedness, I use a scenario 
in the interviews as a stimulus material. The scenario is based on the corruption scandals 
of JPMorgan, which routinely hired sons and daughters of government officials to win 
government contracts (New York Times, 2013). By evaluating the behavior described in 
the scenario, the participants reveal 1) what aspects of political connectedness they focus 
their attention on (legal/moral aspects vs. economic/relational aspects), 2) how they 
frame political connectedness (threat vs. opportunity), and finally 3) how their framings 
influence their responses, including their likelihood to engage in political connectedness, 
the solutions they propose, and their perceptions of the causes of political connectedness. 
The interview data was analyzed by using NVivo software. The theory and the findings of 
this research contribute to the institutional logics literature by elaborating on the 
cognitive mechanisms by which logics affect firm’s responses. It also contributes to the 
sensemaking literature by showing that the entire sensemaking process does not occur at 
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the managerial level and independent of the environment, but is rather embedded in 
institutions.       
 
1.3 Essay 3 
In the final essay, entitled, Institutional logics, managerial sensemaking, and 
internationalization strategy, I examine how managerial sensemaking shapes firm’s 
responses to dissimilar logics of firm-government interaction by looking at the 
relationship between managerial attention to firm’s external environment and firm’s 
internationalization strategies.  
Drawing on the managerial sensemaking literature (Daft et al., 1988; Nadkarni & 
Barr, 2008), I argue that managers either focus their attention on the market environment 
or on the institutional environment. I also propose that such differences in scanning 
emphasis will affect whether dissimilar institutional logics such as patrimonial logic are 
framed by managers either as a threat or an opportunity, which in turn will affect their 
internationalization choices such as whether expand into developed countries, in which 
bureaucratic logic prevails, or into emerging countries, in which patrimonial logic 
prevails. Analysis of the panel data shows that managerial attention to the market 
environment is positively associated with firm expansion into developed countries, 
whereas managerial attention to the institutional environment is positively associated 
with firm expansion into emerging countries,. Thus, the essay contributes to the 
institutional explanations of internationalization strategy by demonstrating the cognitive 
underpinnings of internationalization strategy. 
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1.3.1 Methodology  
This essay uses a panel of 152 U.S. manufacturing firms operating in global 
industries from 2003 to 2007 to test the arguments. The sample is limited to global 
industries only because firms within such industries pursue global strategies. The 
implication is that the market environment and the economic environment should be 
paramount for the decision makers of these firms, whereas institutional differences across 
countries should not draw considerable attention. If the results of this study support this 
argument for firms in global industries, however, then the findings can be easily 
generalized to firms in other industries, as managers in multi-domestic and transnational 
industries are under more pressures to adapt their strategies to local contexts, and hence 
are more likely to focus their attention on the institutional discrepancies between 
countries. 
Following the extant sensemaking literature (Levy, 2005; Nadkarni et al., 2011), I 
use CEO’s letters to shareholders published in the annual reports to elicit data for 
managerial sensemaking. I collect annual reports from Mergent Web Reports, as well as 
from firms’ official websites. I was able to locate as much as 537 letters. Another 223 
letters either could not be located or were not published. I obtain data regarding attention 
by using word counts from CEO’s letters to shareholders published in annual reports. 
Word count has been typically employed in several studies to measure managerial 
sensemaking (Kaplan, 2008; Levy, 2005). Following Kaplan (2008), I develop a coding 
list mostly from the ground up. I select the phrases and words referring to different 
domains of the external environments after manually coding several letters from all the 
 7 
 
 
industries represented in the sample. After the coding list was complete, I used NVivo to 
conduct automated coding on the whole sample.  
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Table 1.1: Dissertation overview 
 
 Essay 1: What’s the 
logic behind political 
connectedness?  
Essay 2: Making 
sense of political 
connectedness: 
Corruption or 
strategy? 
Essay 3: Institutional 
logics, managerial 
sensemaking, and 
internationalization 
strategy  
Theoretical 
foundations 
Institutional logics Institutional logics, 
managerial 
sensemaking 
Institutional logics, 
managerial 
sensemaking 
Data Perspective Transcribed interview 
texts 
Longitudinal database, 
CEO’s letters to 
shareholders  
Analytical 
techniques 
 Content analysis Automated word count, 
negative binomial 
regression  
Theoretical 
contributions 
Provides a fresh 
perspective in 
studying political 
connectedness by 
explaining how 
different interplays 
among multiple logics 
differently shape 
firm-government 
interaction across 
countries. 
Shows how different 
institutional logics 
differently shape 
managerial 
sensemaking and 
responses to political 
connectedness. 
Demonstrates how 
managerial attention 
affects strategic 
responses to dissimilar 
institutional logics of 
firm-government 
interaction by shaping 
internationalization 
choices regarding 
whether to expand into 
developed countries or 
into emerging 
countries.  
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CHAPTER 2 
WHAT IS THE LOGIC BEHIND POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS? 
 
“Some call it gratuities. Some call them questionable payments. Some 
call it extortion. Some call it grease. Some call it bribery. I look at these 
payments as necessary to sell a product. I never felt I was doing 
anything wrong.” (New York Times, 2008) 
 
Carl Kotchian, former chief operating officer (COO) and vice chairman of 
Lockheed reflected his bitterness in this way in a 1977 profile in the New York Times, at 
the Lockheed directors who ousted him from his positions in 1976 based on his $38 
million of “questionable payments”. He admitted paying millions of dollars over more 
than a decade to the Dutch, Japanese and West German politicians, to Italian officials and 
generals, and to other highly placed figures from Hong Kong to Saudi Arabia, in order to 
guarantee contracts for military aircrafts. This led to tremendous political upheaval in 
these countries in the 1970s: Japan's prime minister was jailed, the Italian President 
resigned, The Dutch Queen threatened to abdicate, etc. 
Mr. Kotchian’s confessions generated such a backlash in several countries 
because the payments he admitted making were considered as bribes, which are deemed 
unjustifiable on many grounds; e.g., from an economic perspective, they skew the 
allocation of resources and hence hinder economic development (Brouthers, Gao, & 
McNicol, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Mauro, 1995; Schleifer & Vishny, 1993); from a
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legal standpoint, they are illegal and hence undermine the rule of law (Bardhan, 1997; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Kaufmann, 1997; Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Spencer & Gomez, 
2011). However, Mr. Kotchian never admitted paying a bribe. Although he admitted 
paying government officials around the world to purchase his company’s products, he 
maintained that those payments comprised a necessary part of an exchange between a 
corporation and a government. This raises questions such as “what constitutes a bribe?”, 
and “how do we distinguish a bribe from a legitimate exchange between firm and the 
government?”  
Research on corruption and political connectedness in international business is yet 
to address these questions (Svensson, 2005). In this regard, most studies have not sought 
to elaborate on the principle or set of principles that distinguish a legitimate exchange 
between a firm and a government from an illegitimate one (Harstad & Svensson, 2011). 
Instead, the boundary that separates between legitimate and illegitimate exchanges in 
researchers’ countries – developed countries – has been taken for granted, and was 
imposed on countries – emerging countries – whose institutions are fundamentally 
dissimilar in kind (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Tsui, 2007). In this regard, personalized 
exchanges between firms and governments that transcend beyond the legitimate  
practices of influence-buying such as lobbying and campaign contributions is labeled as 
corruption. As a result, most research have ended up applying rational-legal and 
economic standards to the issue (Bardhan, 1997), and have not accounted for; 1) the 
cognitive/symbolic elements by which people define a legitimate exchange, i.e. the 
elements by which people give meaning to a particular action or practice (Coleman, 
1990); 2) the cross-country variations in these cognitive/symbolic elements, which may 
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shift the definitions of a legitimate exchange and make different types of action or 
practice “rational” or “normal” in different countries (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Witt & 
Redding, 2009). In this paper, I fill these voids by addressing two research questions: 
 
Research question 1: How is the boundary that separates legitimate and 
illegitimate exchanges between firms and governments in a society drawn? 
Research question 2: How does this boundary differ across countries?  
 
I aim to answer to these questions by drawing on the institutional logics 
perspective (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury, 2012). 
Institutional logics are defined as “overarching sets of principles that prescribe how to 
interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to 
succeed (Thornton, 2004: 70). Logics, in other words, provide guidelines on how to 
interpret and function in social situations (Greenwood et al., 2011: 318). The notion of 
institutional multiplicity or complexity in this perspective suggests that society is 
constituted through multiple institutional logics, each of whom governs an institutional 
order, such as the market, state, family, community, religion, etc. The logic of each 
institutional order differentially shapes the meanings that people give to the situations 
they face (Thornton et al., 2012). The logics of these institutional orders “are 
interdependent, and yet also contradictory” (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 250). In this 
regard, multiple institutional logics that are available to actors can interact and compete 
for influence in all societal domains (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010). As a result, the logic of 
one domain can be transposed to another domain and infuse the same practice with a 
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different meaning. Therefore, paying government officials to win government contracts 
may be considered as grease, or a breach of law, or kin loyalty, or a reciprocal obligation, 
depending on which logic is applied to make sense of the issue. Based on this, I argue 
that it is the outcome of the interplay among multiple institutional logics in a given 
context that determines how corporate actors draw the boundary separating legitimate 
and illegitimate exchanges between firms and governments.      
As for the second research question, I argue that in many emerging countries, 
weak logics of the market and the state blend with the strong logics of the family and the 
community to generate patrimonial logic, which results in the prevalence of patronage 
ties between firms and governments. In developed countries, on the other hand, market 
logic and state logic dominate the institutional system, “insulating” the domain of firm-
government relations against the logics of the family and the community. This results in 
bureaucratic logic, which leads to the prevalence of rule-based, impersonal exchanges 
between firms and governments.     
 
2.1 Institutional logics  
Institutional logics are defined as “overarching sets of principles that prescribe 
how to interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to 
succeed (Thornton, 2004: 70). Logics, in other words, shape individual and 
organizational behavior by providing guidelines on how to interpret and function in 
certain situations (Greenwood et al., 2011: 318). Although the institutional logics 
perspective (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012) has long been used in 
management scholarship, its application in international business research has remained 
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limited. I employ institutional logics framework as the base theoretical foundation for this 
essay for three reasons.   
First, the institutional logics perspective is based on the premise that institutions 
comprise both material and symbolic elements. Structures and practices materialize the 
ideas represented by symbols, while symbols give meaning to these structures and 
practices (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999; Zilber, 2008). This suggests that structures and 
common practices that constitute the business environment in emerging countries cannot 
be understood without their underlying meanings. For example, political connectedness 
may be corruption in developed countries, but it may be a non-market capability in 
emerging countries. In this regard, the institutional logics approach complements the 
social perspective in international business, which focuses solely on the observable 
material aspects of institutions and attaches a priori meanings to them.  
Second, international business literature typically emphasizes either economic or 
social aspects of institutions. In this regard, the economic view focuses on the incentive 
structures determined by institutions, while the latter stresses the isomorphic pressures 
exerted by institutions, to explain responses to emerging country institutions. Yet, the 
institutional logics perspective suggests that actors can be motivated by both economic 
and social considerations (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). 
Organizations and individuals comply with logics to gain not only social endorsement but 
also economic benefits. Incorporation of logics does not make actors only legitimate, but 
also competitive (Thornton, 2002). This view thus has the potential to bridge the gap 
between the economic and social views in international business. 
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Finally, the institutional logics perspective suggests that organizational and 
individual sensemaking are nested within institutions that are simultaneously constraining 
and enabling (Thornton et al., 2012). Institutions constrain sensemaking in the sense that 
the interests, identities and assumptions of actors are embedded in prevailing institutional 
logics. In this respect, logics are rule-like, socially shared understandings that form the 
cognitive underpinnings of existing social structures and common practices. At the same 
time, institutional logics enable sensemaking in the sense that they provide actors with 
the opportunities to elaborate on and develop prevailing institutional logics. In this 
respect, institutional logics are toolkits that can be used by actors. This suggests that the 
way firms and decision makers respond to political connectedness can vary depending on 
the logic they use to make sense of it. For example, managers of a developed country 
firm can make sense of political connectedness as a non-market capability if they learn 
patrimonial logic and apply it to the firm-government context in emerging countries. 
Institutional logics perspective is based on the notion of institutional complexity, 
i.e. institutions are composed of multiple and competing logics that simultaneously 
coexist, and that are interdependent on each other (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Kraatz & Block, 2008). Each institutional 
order represents a governance style that shape individual and organizational preferences 
and interests and the repertoire of behaviors by which interests and preferences are 
attained within the sphere of influence of that order (Frederick & Alford, 1991: 232). 
Table 2.1 represents how individuals and organizations, if influenced by any one 
institutional order, are likely to understand their sense of self and identity, i.e. who they 
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are, their logics of action, how they act, their vocabularies of motive, and what language 
is salient, etc.  
The notion of institutional complexity explains heterogeneity in behavior and 
associated meanings not only across domains in a given society but also across societies. 
In this respect, we observe a variety of practices and meanings in a particular domain 
when different institutional orders come into play to different extents across countries. In 
other words, divergent practices are observed among countries because a variety of logics 
are applied, or transposed, to provide people with cognitive and behavioral guidelines. 
For example, bureaucratic nation-state, and consequently state logic, exists everywhere, 
but what it is and what it should do depend on its interactions with other institutional 
logics in a society. It can be argued that governments in developed countries are 
generally functional, i.e. they are to provide technical solutions to economic problems, 
such as supporting markets to sustain economic development. Governments in these 
countries are believed to play a crucial role in facilitating market exchange, as suggested 
by the World Bank governance indicators
1
 (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1999), 
all of which concern state’s capacity to support a modern market system. This notion of 
state is heavily influenced by market logic that is concerned with creating perfect, or self-
regulated, markets, which is believed to result in utility maximization at the societal level 
and hence in increased social well-being. In emerging countries, on the other hand, state 
may have different functions. In Gulf countries, for example, paternalistic states led by 
sheikhs are responsible for looking after their subjects, who are supposed to show loyalty 
to their ruler in return. In this respect, a huge majority of citizens in these countries are 
employed by state organizations and state-owned enterprises. This indicates that the state 
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in such countries is theorized more as a family – or a tribe – comprised of network of 
individuals – i.e. family logic – or groups, than as a bureaucratic organization – i.e. state 
logic (Friedland & Alford, 1991). Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to expect 
the government in these countries to be governed more by family logic than state logic. 
This sort of interplay among logics should also influence the way firm-government 
relations occur, which will be discussed in the following section.   
The concept of inter-institutional system was first introduced by Friedland and 
Alford (1991), whose purpose was to identify the central institutions of the contemporary 
Western societies. In this regard, they identified capitalist market, bureaucratic state, 
democracy, nuclear family, and Christianity as the pillars that shape preferences, 
interests, and behavior in those societies. This conceptualization was first modified by 
Thornton (2004), and subsequently by Thornton et al. (2012). The aim of these authors 
differed from that of Friedland and Alford (1991) in the sense that they sought to advance 
the theory of institutional logics by making it suitable for empirical inquiry through the 
development of a typology of ideal types (Thornton et al., 2012), rather than identifying 
the central institutional orders in a particular society or societies. To this end, Thornton et 
al. identified seven institutional orders: family, community, religion, state, market, 
profession, and corporation.  
The strategies, values and economic systems associated with each order represent 
ideal types, i.e. they are unlikely to apply to any particular research context. However, the 
notion of institutional complexity suggests that behavior is determined not by the logic of 
one institutional order, but by how logics of different institutional orders come into play 
in a particular context. In this sense, all ideal types exist in every society to different 
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extents, and in different interactions with each other. Therefore, the way that logics of 
ideal types blend is what causes heterogeneity across time and space. Based on the extant 
literature, I identify four institutional orders, or ideal types, that shape behavior in the 
domain of firm-government interaction: market (Lui, 1985; Tanzi, 1998), state (Collins, 
1980; Polanyi, 2001), family (Roth, 1968; Weber, 1968) and community (Budd, 2004; 
Fukuyama, 2011). I argue that the different blending of these four orders explain 
variations across countries in the way government-business relations take place.         
 
2.1.1 Market logic 
This logic is concerned with the activities human undertake in order to conduct 
exchange in the most efficient manner (Friedland & Alford, 1991). According to this, 
individuals’ behavior is a consequence of independent, rational choices they make based 
on the objective assessments of their interests (Smith, 1776). 
Market logic and firm-government interaction. Under market logic, self-regulated 
market is the perfect resource allocation mechanism through which both individual and 
social welfare can be achieved (Friedman 1962; Smith, 1776; Stigler, 1971). This regards 
the effect of any non-market element on exchange as an interference that disrupts the 
market and consequently hurts economic performance. As mentioned before, some 
economists who apply market logic to firm-government interaction attribute corruption to 
existence of the regulatory state (Stigler, 1971; Tanzi, 1988). The implication of this for 
firm-government interaction is that the degree of insertion of the regulatory state in the 
market leads to corruption (Bardhan, 1997). 
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However, many economists reject the notion of perfect markets. As Friedman 
(1962) states, markets work as long as transactions are voluntary and informed, but 
markets alone do not have any mechanisms to ensure this. Therefore, he argues that 
markets work only if states make and enforce the rules that enforce contracts, define 
property rights, and facilitate information sharing. North (1990) goes further and argues 
that market activities are shaped by not only formal, but also by informal rules. Many 
social science researchers similarly criticized market logic for focusing narrowly on the 
market and ignoring the other logics embedded in the broad institutional and social 
structures that shape market activities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Friedland & Alford, 
1991; Granovetter, 1985; North, 1990; Polanyi, 2001).  
From an institutional logics approach, it can be argued that market logic alone 
cannot influence behavior. Though it may be the dominant logic in one context, other 
institutional orders may still have potential impact on judgment and behavior. Not every 
human activity can be converted into a commodity that has a monetary price and that can 
be exchanged in the market among rational utility maximizing individuals (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991). Other institutional orders generate symbolic utilities such as values. These 
are absolute utilities; not only they do not have explicit price, but they also cannot be 
traded off against each other. The implication is that, firms’ strategic choices regarding 
how to deal with governments are not contingent on some objective assessments of 
utility, but are rather contingent on the whole inter-institutional system (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991). In other words, the rationality and legitimacy of an exchange between 
firms and governments is defined and shaped by the ongoing interaction among all 
institutional orders, not by the market forces alone. 
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2.1.2 State logic 
This logic concerns the regulation and coordination of human activity through 
bureaucratic hierarchies, with the aim of increasing social well-being (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991; Weber, 1968). Bureaucratized state, the paramount actor in state logic, is 
based on specialized professional administrators and on a law made and applied by full-
time professional jurists for a populace characterized by rights of citizenship (Weber, 
1968; Collins, 1980).  
The emergence of state logic dates back to the rise of the bureaucratic states in the 
late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century (Collins, 1980). Before that, legal systems were 
characterized by patrimonial or magical-religious procedures, by differential application 
to different social groups and by different localities, and by the practices of officials 
seeking private gain (: 930). The rise of bureaucratic state, however, led to the 
enforcement of written laws which ascribed culpability to the individual rather than 
groups (Friedland & Alford, 1991). In this sense, bureaucratic state constituted the 
individual as an abstract legal subject with rights –specified independently of social 
structure – before the law, responsible for his or her actions (: 239).  
State logic and firm-government interaction. Through rationally calculable and 
universally applied system of law courts, state logic strictly separates between private and 
public spheres, in other words, between state and society, thereby inhibiting arbitrary 
political interference with markets (Collins, 1980; Friedland & Alford, 1991). In this 
regard, all exchanges between firms and governments are supposed to be strictly rule-
based. Any personal discretion used by a government official represents a violation of the 
core principles of state logic, and hence under state logic, i.e. under the ideal type of state 
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institutional order, any personalized exchange between firms and governments are seen 
as illegitimate, and labeled as corruption.  
A big problem emerges when state logic is transposed to understand firm-
government interaction in emerging countries. Although we see some elements of state 
logic in these countries, it is not strong enough in the institutional system to impose a 
rational-legal order. The notion of bureaucratic states that attempt to convert diverse 
individual situations into the basis for routine official decisions (Friedland & Alford, 
1991: 249), does not necessarily apply to the context of emerging countries. 
Consequently, we should see a shift in the boundary that defines legitimate exchanges 
between firms and governments where emerging countries are considered. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the subsequent sections of the paper.    
 
2.1.3 Family logic  
The logic of the family is the motivation of human activity through unconditional 
loyalty with the aim of increasing family reputation and honor (Friedland & Alford, 
1991). In this regard, families attempt to convert all social relations into unconditional 
obligations oriented to meet collective needs. Patriarchalism, which Weber (1968) 
defines as the authority of a master over his household, epitomizes how this logic shapes 
governance. Patriarchal rulers need no bureaucratic machinery to enforce their policies. 
They rather depend on the willingness of their subjects to obey their “father”, who 
protects and provides for his “children”, and who elevates the status of the whole family 
in return.         
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Family logic and firm-government interaction. In developed countries, the 
unconditional loyalties which are the ideal of familial relations do not provide a 
legitimate model for economic behavior. In fact, the logic of the family is allowed to 
influence economic behavior only on the margins of Western societies, such as the Mafia, 
or small businesses that are rooted in immigrant communities (Fukuyama, 1996; Tan & 
Peng, 2002). Once such practices are spotted, they are regarded as deviant, 
traditionalistic, and even pathological (Friedland & Alford, 1991). In emerging countries, 
however, it is widely recognized that allegiance to kinship-based or clan-based loyalties 
often takes precedence over self-interest and formal rules (Bardhan, 1997, Budd, 2004; 
Fukuyama, 2011; Roth, 1968; Theobald, 1982; Uricoechea, 1980). Under such 
circumstances, it may be “rational” for people to continue to exchange with those who 
they are related with, to the exclusion of others, even though there are more profitable 
alternatives.  
The situation described above is not limited to exchanges within the market, but 
also applies to exchanges between firms and governments. In the West, where legal 
standards – state logic – are applied to such exchanges, anonymous bureaucratic rules 
strictly regulate the relations between government and business. In developing countries, 
however, where legal standards are subdued by relational norms – or when state logic is 
subdued by family logic –, exchanges between business and government become 
personalized. Under these circumstances, use of public resources to cater to particularistic 
loyalties becomes quite common and routinely expected (Bardhan, 1997: 1330). For 
example, a common aphorism in some pre-1989 Soviet-dominated societies urged that 
“those who do not steal from the state steal from their families” (Misangyi et al., 2008: 
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753). This suggests that to the extent that exchanges between firms and governments are 
not subject to the formal rule of law, they are likely to be subject to the informal rules of 
relational obligations. It is this characteristic of developing countries that makes 
personalized, relationship-based exchanges between firms and governments “rational”, 
and “legitimate”. 
 
2.1.4 Community logic 
Contemporary communities approach (O'Mahony and Lakhani, 2011) defines 
community as “a group of people who coalesce around any number of identity sources”. 
This definition includes communities ranging from local communities, socio-political 
movements, religious groups, social classes, diaspora, etc. The logic of all these 
communities is based on the motivation of human activity through reciprocal obligations 
with the aim of increasing the status of the community (Thornton et al., 2012).   
Community logic and firm-government interaction. Individual behavior in a 
community is aimed at serving collective interests by forming relational networks with 
other members (Thornton et al., 2012). Such relationships are not based on self-interest, 
but rather on trust and reciprocity among members. They are not governed by the formal 
rule of law, but rather by informal group norms and values. As a result, community logic 
shapes behavior quite differently from market logic and state logic. The implication for 
firm-government interaction is that if community logic prevails over state logic, then 
exchanges between firms and governments will be shaped by the informal norms that are 
embedded in the relational networks rather than by the formal rules. Thus, the influence 
of community logic in an institutional system is likely to lead to informal ties between 
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firms and governments. In short, the arguments made for the role of family logic in 
emerging countries can be made also for community logic. The difference between 
family logic and community logic is that the former concerns unconditional obligations 
based on kinship and clanship, whereas the latter is related to reciprocal obligations based 
on a shared identity (Bardhan, 1997; Fukuyama, 2011). In this regard, the influence of 
community logic in an institutional system is likely to lead to horizontal networks 
between firms and governments, or so-called cronyism, whereas that of family logic is 
likely result in vertical networks between firms and governments, or so-called patron-
client relationships, or patronage ties.    
 
2.1.5 Blending institutional logics 
As explained before, the notion of institutional complexity in the institutional 
logics perspective suggests that multiple logics simultaneously exist and shape behavior 
(Thornton et al., 2012). In this sense, it is likely that firm-government interaction in a 
particular context is guided by multiple logics.  
For example, the modern market system that exists in developed countries is 
governed by a blend of market and state logics. In this regard, market – as we know it – 
needs a strong bureaucratic state in order to function. As Friedman (1962) argues, free 
markets cannot exist without a state. State’s duties in this regard include maintaining law 
and order, defining property rights, adjudicating disputes about the interpretation of the 
rules, enforcing contracts, promoting competition, providing a monetary framework, etc 
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Kaufman, 1997; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Kim, Kim, & 
Hoskisson, 2010; North, 1990; Peng, 2003). After all, it was the state logic that provided 
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the basis for a reliable system of banking, investment, property, and contracts, and set the 
stage for the industrial revolution in the first place (Collins, 1980).  It was the strong 
bureaucratic states of the West that formed the institutional underpinnings of markets, 
and hence created Polanyi (2001) similarly argues that the modern market system – 
market logic – cannot be understood independent of the modern nation-state – state logic. 
In this regard, he gives a very detailed historical study of how markets, which did not 
exist prior to the Industrial Revolution, were created for the first time. In the 18
th
 century 
British statesmen, who were informed by the theories of classical economists – i.e. 
market logic –, tried to create an economic system based on the notion of self-regulated 
markets. Though created and sustained by state logic, this system was thought to be 
independent of the state and society – in line with market logic. After market came to be 
successful with the Industrial Revolution in Britain, market logic spread throughout the 
world. In short, market – and its logic –, is not a natural phenomenon that has existed 
since the beginning of humanity, but rather a superimposition by the British State on its 
society in the 18
th
 century (Collins, 1980; Polanyi, 2001). The implication is that market 
logic cannot take roots unless state logic is already developed. In this sense, a strong state 
logic may not necessarily lead to strong market logic, but is a prerequisite for it (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Kaufman et al., 1999; Williamson, 2004).  
Another example that shows how different logics interact with each other is the 
guanxi-based gift-economy, i.e. gifts in return for a favor. Despite seemingly being a 
simple market exchange, gift is more than a commodity in the practice of guanxi, because 
it is not independent of the social relationship in which it is exchanged (Yang, 1989). In 
this respect, Yang argues that the practice of guanxi is rooted in a culturally specific 
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relational conception of the person, where identities are constructed through the 
internalization of others' judgments. Guanxi thus depends upon creating identities, 
whatever the basis, between people such that norms of mutual obligation can be 
activated. Gift giving is an aggressive material and symbolical construction of 
commonality of insideness, from which obligation logically flows (Friedland & Alford, 
1991: 258–259). Put in this way, guanxi-based gift giving reflects a community logic that 
aims to increase the community’s status by creating a common identity and reciprocal 
obligations between members. This is distinct from market logic that is based on 
impersonal, one-time exchanges. Yet, this is not to argue that guanxi-based gift-giving 
does not include any elements of market logic. It is not realistic to assume that parties of 
such an exchange are not driven by self-interest whatsoever. Yet, interests and how to 
maximize them are shaped by the interaction between market logic and community logic, 
rather than the former alone. In this sense, Chinese people are not necessarily repulsed by 
the notion of self-interest, but the blend of market logic and community logic provides 
them a different understanding of self-interest, as well as of how to achieve it.    
 
2.2 Legitimacy of exchanges between firms and governments  
 
2.2.1 Corruption 
When used in the domain of firm-government interaction, the word corruption 
refers to an illegitimate exchange between a firm and the government. Thus, we need to 
look at how corruption is defined and studied if we want to understand how the boundary 
that separates between legitimate and illegitimate exchanges is drawn. In this regard, 
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research on corruption has been dominated by two perspectives. A careful reading of 
these perspectives reveals that they embody three logics. One perspective is solely 
concerned with the role of rational self-interest and efficiency pressures, and is thus 
dominated by market logic (Klitgaard, 1988; Leff, 1989; Lui, 1985; Tanzi, 1998). The 
other perspective deals with the regulation of corruption through both disciplinary market 
forces and law, and hence is more influenced by a blend of market and state logics 
(Bardhan, 1997; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Kaufmann, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Mauro, 
1995; Schleifer & Vishny, 1993).   
The first perspective applies market logic to the issue of corruption. In other 
words, actors are considered to engage in corruption simply because they have incentives 
do so. One stream of research in this perspective even suggests that the presence of the 
state distorts supply and demand, while corruption is a mechanism that equalizes it (Leff, 
1989; Lui, 1985). According to this, it is the state that creates the motivation for 
corruption by impeding free markets. This point is bluntly illustrated by Tanzi (1998): “If 
we abolish the state, we abolish corruption” (: 566). Overall, this perspective sees 
corruption either as a way to overcome excessive regulatory burdens that inhibit markets 
to operate, or as an incentive for the government officials to work harder. The former 
argument is usually applied to developing countries in which state intervention is an 
issue, whereas the latter applies to developed countries too (Mauro, 1995). Such 
arguments clearly epitomize market logic.  
State logic constitutes the origin of a definition of corruption that is commonly 
used in research and practice: “Abuse of public power for private gain”. This definition is 
widely adopted by the literature (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Kaufmann, 1997; Schleifer & 
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Vishny, 1993; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005; Spencer & Gomez, 2011; 
Svensson, 2005; Treisman, 2000; Voyer & Beamish, 2004), and is also officially adopted 
by the World Bank, as well as Transparency International. The term “abuse of public 
power”, of course, typically constitutes a breach of rule of law, and hence involves 
applying a rational-legal standard to the issue (Misangyi et al., 2008; Svensson, 2005). 
Thus, it can be argued that the lens through which we view, explain, and address 
corruption, is rooted in state logic. The approach of International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) to corruption epitomizes this. In this regard, the organization sees corruption as a 
serious threat to the government’s ability to establish and maintain order, and hence a 
factor that dramatically increases country risk:   
“…insidious sorts of corruption are potentially of much greater risk to 
foreign business in that they can lead to popular discontent, unrealistic and 
inefficient controls on the state economy, and encourage the development 
of the black market. 
 
The greatest risk in such corruption is that at some time it will become so 
overweening, or some major scandal will be suddenly revealed, as to 
provoke a popular backlash, resulting in a fall or overthrow of the 
government, a major reorganizing or restructuring of the country's 
political institutions, or, at worst, a breakdown in law and order, rendering 
the country ungovernable.” (ICRG, 2013) 
 
Most studies on corruption, however, represent a blend of state logic and market 
logic, regarding corruption as a rational, self-interested behavior, conducted by persons 
who use their discretion to direct allocations to themselves or to other social actors who 
offer rewards in return for favorable discretionary treatment (Bardhan, 1997; Kaufmann, 
1997; Rose-Ackerman, 2001; Schleifer & Vishny, 1993). Thus, the second perspective 
assumes that corruption is a rational utility maximizing response to situations that present 
opportunities for gain and the discretionary power to appropriate that gain (Misangyi et 
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al., 2008: 751). In this regard, corruption is thought to be best remedied both by curtailing 
discretionary power – e.g. strengthening rule of law, which is a manifestation of state 
logic – (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; La Porta et al., 1999; Mauro, 1995; Voyer & Beamish, 
2004), and by incentives to avoid corrupt activities – e.g. increasing government 
officials’ wages (Klitgaard, 1988), which is a manifestation of market logic. In addition 
to this, an influential stream of research within this perspective is based on the view that 
laws determine the level of corruption in a society indirectly by shaping incentive 
structures (Kaufmann, 1997; Schleifer & Vishny, 1993), e.g. strictly enforced laws 
increase the cost of corruption and hence deter people from engaging in it.   
However, corruption is a complex phenomenon and understanding and changing a 
corrupt system requires a more holistic view. Institutional logics approach tells us that the 
institutional system is not confined to the logic of either the market or the state, but rather 
is composed of several orders. It may be true that it is predominantly market and state 
logics that influence actors’ cognitive and behavioral repertoires in the West, but in other 
countries, different logics may be in play. As a result, practice that is perceived as a 
corrupt transaction in the West, may be interpreted as loyalty or as reciprocal obligation 
in other countries, which may increase the prevalence of that practice in those countries.  
This holistic view of corruption is in line with the neo-institutional approach to 
corruption in international business, which takes into consideration the factors beyond the 
market and the state. In this regard, Spencer and Gomez (2011) demonstrate that when 
multinationals’ managers perceive that a corrupt practice such as bribery has become 
institutionalized in a society, they are more likely to conform to those societal 
expectations to obtain legitimacy. Similarly, Collins and Uhlenbruck (2004) found 
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empirical evidence that managers in India who perceived corruption to reflect ‘the way 
things are done’ locally were more likely to engage in corrupt practices, even when they 
personally viewed them negatively. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) show that multinationals’ 
subsidiaries engage in corruption in highly corrupt countries in order to be congruent 
with local institutions. Despite extending the view on corruption by taking into 
consideration the domains other than the market and the state, this literature in 
international business has neglected to conceptualize corruption. Those scholars rather 
took the Western definition of corruption for granted, and applied it to emerging country 
contexts, assuming that multinationals either challenge or conform to the universally 
defined “corrupt” practices they face in emerging countries. As a result, the literature 
failed to address how multinationals and their decision makers draw the boundary that 
separates between legitimate and illegitimate exchanges.  
As explained earlier, however, the definition of corruption is to a large extent 
shaped by state logic, which makes a clear distinction between legalized exchanges 
between firms and government such as campaign contributions and the illegal ones such 
as bribery. Since state logic is much weaker in emerging countries than in the West, the 
principles used to distinguish legitimate exchanges from illegitimate ones in those 
countries are likely to be different. Thus, we should expect to see different forms of 
exchanges between firms and governments than these two. In fact, many international 
business scholars argue that political connectedness, i.e. inter-personal ties between 
corporate and political actors, is the most common form of firm-government interaction 
in emerging countries (Peng & Heath, 1996; Shi, Markoczy, & Stan, 2014; Wan, 2005).  
 
 30 
 
 
2.2.2 Political connectedness 
International Country Risk Guide (2013) does not provide a definition of political 
connectedness but merely identifies it as a form of corruption: “Political connections 
represent a type of corruption, taking such forms as excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, 'favor-for-favors', or secret party funding”. Yet, literature on political 
connectedness separates from the general corruption literature. This suggests that 
political connectedness is a distinct phenomenon from corruption.  
Peng and Luo (2000) define political ties as individual connections with officers 
at various levels of government. Faccio (2006), in her pioneering empirical study on 
political connectedness around the world, defines a company as politically connected if 
“at least one of its large shareholders – anyone controlling at least 10 percent of voting 
shares – or one of its top officers – i.e. CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, or 
secretary – is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician 
or party.” (: 369). Similarly, Sun, Mellahi, and Wright (2012) define political connections 
as “boundary-spanning personal and institutional linkages between firms and the 
constituent parts of public authorities.” (: 68). All these definitions suggest that political 
connectedness involves a long-term interpersonal relationship as opposed to a one-time 
exchange, which has been the main focus of the general corruption literature.  
This aspect of political connectedness is also supported by the empirical work. 
Fisman (2001) demonstrates that politically well-connected firms in Indonesia lost more 
market value in reaction to the adverse rumors about the state of President Suharto's 
health than firms that are less connected. Similarly, Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) 
show that firms have difficulty re-establishing connections with a new government when 
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their patron falls from power, leading closely connected firms to underperform under the 
new regime. Siegel (2007) reports that Korean firms’ network ties to the political regime 
increases their cross-border alliance activity, while their network ties to the enemies of 
the political regime decreases it. These empirical studies demonstrate that political 
connectedness concerns long-term and personal relationships embedded in the political 
system, and such relationships cannot be easily formed or abandoned, as opposed to 
impersonal exchanges, which are transient and business oriented in nature. 
However, most studies do not elaborate on the nature of those relationships, 
despite some notable exceptions, such as Siegel (2007) and Sun et al. (2012). In this 
regard, the implicit assumption in most of the literature is that the parties build and 
maintain these relationships primarily because they benefit from them (Peng, 2003). This 
understanding embodies market logic that presumes rational behavior informed by the 
principles of utility maximization. Similarly, the literature influenced by state logic does 
not recognize relationships occurring outside the formal rules and roles. It does not 
distinguish corruption from political connectedness, and labels the exchanges that are 
facilitated by personal ties between firms and governments as corruption (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2006; Kaufmann, 1997; Rodriguez et al., 2005). Therefore, we need to look at 
other institutional logics such as family logic and community logic, in order to 
understand the boundaries that separate legitimate exchanges between firms and 
governments from the illegitimate ones in emerging countries. This paper is a step 
towards this direction. 
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2.3 The logic behind political connectedness 
It is very well known that firms and governments are interconnected all over the 
world (Faccio, 2006). This includes the developed countries where state is largely 
withdrawn from the market, such as Canada, and the U.K. Business-government relations 
are believed to be very important for U.S. businesses too (Fisman et al., 2012). Otherwise 
there would not be 12,503 lobbyists in Washington D.C. (Reuters, 2009), the heart a 
political system that seemingly champions market logic at the expense of state logic 
around the world. In this sense, we can look at firm-government interaction as a universal 
phenomenon. 
Yet, this is not to say that this interconnection is attained and utilized in the same 
manner globally. As explained before, most research on political connectedness has 
looked at informal ties in emerging countries. There is little evidence suggesting that 
business-government interaction in developed countries may also be facilitated by 
informal ties. In this regard, Fisman et al. (2012) examined U.S. firms’ political ties to 
Vice President Dick Cheney. They estimated the value of these ties for firms precisely as 
zero, meaning that firms did not benefit from being connected to Dick Cheney. The 
conclusion drawn from this finding is that personal ties to politicians do not yield value to 
firms in the U.S. Fisman et al. attributed this to the existence of formal control 
mechanisms that regulate government-business relations in the U.S. In short, the study 
suggests that firms cannot leverage informal political ties in countries whose formal 
institutions are strong.  
On the other hand, research on political connectedness in emerging countries 
indicates that both the prevalence and the utility of political connectedness are much 
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higher in these countries. Siegel (2007) shows that networks with the political regime 
increased the rate at which Korean companies formed cross-border strategic alliances. 
Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2008) find that Brazilian firms which provided 
contributions to elected federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that 
did not. Peng and Luo (2000) document that managers’ ties with politicians in China 
increase firm performance. Yiu and Lau (2008) report that network ties with the 
government in China increases the intensity of firms’ engagement in corporate 
entrepreneurial activities, which in turn increases firms’ relative performance. Yiu, Lau, 
and Bruton (2007) show that political network ties in China positively affect international 
venturing. 
Overall, the literature regards political connectedness as a rational and interest-
seeking response to the existing formal institutional arrangements in a country. 
Specifically, they see formal rules, i.e. laws and regulations enforced by the strong 
bureaucratic state, as necessary for the otherwise imperfect markets to perform (Khanna 
& Palepu, 1997; North, 1990; Peng, 2003; Wan, 2005). Absence, or weakness of a 
bureaucratic state, is thus seen as an institutional deficiency, or as it is widely known in 
the literature, institutional voids (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Firms are believed to build 
political connections in order to fill, or substitute (Roth & Kostova, 2003) these voids. 
This view assumes that formal rules need to be set up and created by states so that 
markets can function properly and enhance economic performance. This understanding, 
similar to the dominant perspective in the corruption literature, reflects a combination of 
market logic and state logic.  
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Overall, most of the literature on political connectedness considers all sorts of 
informal exchanges between firms and governments as a consequence of institutional 
underdevelopment, and – either implicitly or explicitly – labels them all as inefficient 
forms of business-government interaction. Yet, political connectedness could just be one 
of many ways that enable strategic interaction between firms and governments. From an 
institutional logics perspective, different blends of logics across countries make different 
strategies of interacting with the government available to firms. Thus, the different forms 
of firm-government interaction we see between developed countries and emerging 
countries are primarily caused by different blending of institutional logics. In developed 
countries, market and state logics – i.e. impersonal logics – take precedence over family 
and community logics – i.e. relational logics –, which makes firm-government interaction 
subject to formal control mechanisms such as laws and regulations (North, 1990; Peng, 
2003). As a result, exchanges between firms and governments in these countries tend to 
be impersonal and rule-based. In emerging countries, on the other hand, relational logics 
prevail over impersonal logics, which makes firm-government interaction subject to 
informal control mechanisms such as unconditional loyalties or reciprocal obligations. As 
a result, exchanges between firms and governments in these countries tend to be 
personalized and relationship-based.  
Firms’ rule-based, impersonal – formal – exchanges with governments are 
facilitated by political action committees, lobbying entities, as well as through inter-
organizational ties with other government bodies, such as a joint venture with a state-
owned enterprise (Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010). On the other hand, personalized, 
relationship-based – informal – exchanges with governments are facilitated by variety of 
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political ties, such as those 1) between corporate executives and politicians or 
government officials, e.g. friendships and kinships; 2) between politicians and firms, e.g. 
politicians sitting on corporate boards; and 3) between corporate executives and political 
institutions, e.g. executives appointed as politicians (Faccio, 2006). Table 2.3 contrasts 
the two types of firm-government interaction.   
 
2.4 Varieties of Firm Government Interactions 
The domination of an institutional system by a combination of market logic and 
state logic is a mixture of the ideal economic systems of the two logics, i.e. market 
capitalism and welfare capitalism. The consequent economic system is one in which 
neither can market dominate for economic gain nor can state for social gain. This is in 
fact the case in all developed countries
2
, in which the government provides with the legal 
and regulatory framework that regulates and coordinates market exchange with the aim of 
increasing social well-being, but also in which there is always some market exchange that 
exists beyond the state's reach. I call this blend of market and state logics bureaucratic 
logic.  
Emerging countries, on the other hand, have other logics than those of the state 
and of the market that shape their economic systems. Weak state logic in these countries 
mean that rule of law is not strong. The implication is that although the states in these 
countries may attempt to regulate and coordinate economic activity, they are not 
subordinate to rational and legal standards when doing it. They also lack the capacity and 
legitimacy to exert control over economy. Furthermore, weak market logic means that 
exchanges are not always based on rational utility maximization. On the other hand, 
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strong family logic and community logic in these countries make unconditional loyalties 
and reciprocal obligations important factors that shape behavior. Drawing on the extant 
literature (Budd, 2004; Fukuyama, 2011; Roth, 1968; Theobald, 1982; Uricoechea, 
1980), I call this blend of institutional logics – i.e. weak market and state logics, 
combined with strong family and community logics – patrimonial logic. In such a 
system, patronage ties between corporate actors and political actors constitute a common 
practice. Considering this, the existence of patrimonial logic as opposed to bureaucratic 
logic is probably the most important element that distinguishes emerging countries from 
developed countries.  
The German sociologist Max Weber (1968) originally coined the term 
patrimonialism. According to him, patrimonialism meant that the governmental offices 
originate in the household administration of the patriarchal ruler. Patrimonialism, in this 
sense, is a result of the extension of patriarchal rule to the military, economic, and 
political functions of the state. In other words, patrimonialism occurs when the personage 
representing the ruling family is amalgamated with the state. This diffusion of patriarchal 
rule to bureaucracy corresponds to the blend between family logic and state logic in this 
paper. Scholars who built on Weber subsequently added community logic to this blend. 
For example, Fukuyama (2011) argues that patronage ties are based on the two principles 
of kin selection and reciprocal altruism. In this case, the former clearly corresponds to 
family logic, while the latter certainly amounts to community logic.  
It is important to note that this paper diverges from the extant patrimonialism 
literature in its view of institutions. According to the latter, institutions differ across 
countries in degree, not in kind (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Thus, the patrimonialism 
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literature sees patronage ties as a consequence of weak or absent impersonal institutions. 
In this regard, Weber identified patrimonialism as one of the three forms of traditional 
domination, the other two being charismatic leadership and feudalism. Although scholars 
like Fukuyama extended and contributed to Weber’s original conceptualization of 
patrimonialism, the view of patronage ties as an inferior, archaic, exotic, and an 
ineffective form of governance has remained consistent in the literature. For example, 
Roth (1968) describes several features of patrimonialism including the survival of a 
traditional regime, “where the researcher, if he gains access at all, can almost perform the 
feat of travelling into the past” (p. 195-196). Uricoechea (1980), in his analysis of 
patrimonial foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic State, equates patrimonialism with 
the militarization of the Brazilian society and the consequent human rights abuses: 
“Monstrosity may be defined as a mode of being, the essential changes of which are 
contingent and accidental. If we accept this definition, we can readily apply it to 
patrimonial bureaucracy" (p. 43). Similar to this, Budd (2004) argues that patrimonialism 
hinders democracy and economic growth in emerging countries. Finally, Fukuyama 
(2011) sees patrimonialism as a source of political decay, and an impediment to state 
building.   
As explained earlier, however, an important tenet of this paper is that institutions 
are not universal (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Tsui, 2007; Whetten, 2009). Impersonal 
institutions, i.e. bureaucratic logic that shapes firm-government interaction in the West 
are not necessarily the norm. Neither is the patrimonial logic that shapes firm-
government interaction in emerging countries should be seen as “voids”, or “deviations” 
from the ideal-typical situation. Thus, the main argument of this paper is logic blending 
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gives rise not just to differences of degree, but the fundamental differences in kind 
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Overall, different forms of firm-government relations across 
countries are determined by different interplays among institutional logics that create a 
systemic logic that makes a certain form of firm-government interaction prevalent. In this 
sense, formal exchanges between firms and governments should be more common in 
countries where market logic and state logic are strong enough to confine family logic 
and community logic to their domains. On the other hand, informal exchanges between 
firms and governments should be more common in countries where logic of the family 
and community are strong enough to suppress the logics of the market and the state. 
Figure 2.2 shows countries according to the interplay among institutional logics. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
In developed countries, where bureaucratic logic dominates, the boundary that 
separates legitimate exchanges between firms and governments from the illegitimate ones 
is determined primarily determined by one principle: the exchange should be based on 
impersonal rules. Under bureaucratic logic, there is a strict separation between public and 
private, and hence government officials avoid personalized exchanges, as well as using 
their power for personal gain. Therefore, in developed countries, a legitimate firm-
government interaction is mainly in the form of lobbying or campaign contributions.  In 
emerging countries, however, where family and community logics dominate, exchanges 
between firms and governments are often personalized. Thus, it is legitimate for 
government officials in those countries to fulfill their familial or reciprocal obligations by 
using public power to favor relatives and “clients”, as well as friends. In this sense, it is 
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normal and rational for exchanges between firms and governments to be facilitated by 
horizontal and vertical networks between corporate and political actors. This, however, is 
deemed as corruption in developed countries, as family and community logics are weak, 
while state logic is strong. This addresses the research questions of this paper by 
explaining 1) how the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate exchanges between 
firms and governments are drawn, and 2) how this boundary differs across countries. 
There have been very few attempts to define what corruption and political 
connectedness are, and how they differ from each other. In this respect, one definition, 
“abuse of public power for personal gain”, has been taken for granted, and deeply 
influenced the scholarly approach to the issue. This definition, however, embodies 
bureaucratic logic, which shapes the way firms and governments interact with each other 
in the West. In emerging countries, on the other hand, patrimonial logic provides 
different strategies of action, and hence leads to different forms of exchanges between 
firms and governments. In this regard, most studies on emerging countries have ended up 
imposing Western bureaucratic logic on non-Western phenomena (Tsui, 2007), and 
erroneously labeled all kinds of informal ties between firms and governments as 
corruption. Drawing from the institutional logics perspective, this study offers a fresh 
lens to study firm-government interaction in emerging country contexts, where, not only 
the logics of the market and the state, but also those of the family and the community 
together shape the boundary that separates legitimate and illegitimate exchanges between 
firms and governments.        
This essay also contributes to the institutional logics literature by demonstrating 
that how dissimilar logics blend. In this regard, some of the extant literature has typically 
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focused on a single dominant logic that shapes the entire institutional system. For 
example, Lounsbury (2002) documented that during the 1980s, the regulatory logic that 
emphasized bank lending in the US financial sector yielded to a market logic, which gave 
rise to retail-oriented financial services competition. Similarly, Lounsbury (2007) 
demonstrated that the mutual fund industry in Boston is dominated by trustee logic, 
which represents a traditional, long-term oriented, and craft-based approach to money 
management. He found that the mutual fund industry in New York, on the other hand, is 
dominated by a performance logic, which represents a modern, short-term oriented, 
professional approach to money management. Although some other studies in the logics 
literature have acknowledged the co-existence of competing logics, these scholars have 
assumed that such different logics separately guide different actors. For example, Reay 
and Hinnings (2009) argued that physicians in the Canadian health care industry adhered 
to professional logic, whereas the government supported business logic. Marquis and 
Lounsbury (2007) argued that two logics in the US banking industry compete to 
dominate the organizational field: national logic manifested through national banks, and 
community logic reflected through community banks. Similarly, Greenwood et al. (2010) 
found that the downsizing decisions of large firms concentrated in regions whose 
governments champion regional distinctiveness are influenced by regional logic, whereas 
those of smaller firms are shaped by family logic. Luo (2007) identified two logics that 
determine training attitudes across countries: statism, which emphasizes state authority 
over civil society, and corporatism, which emphasizes a guild-based system with 
collective bargaining and apprenticeship over a market system with hire-and-fire 
practices. She found that countries with strong statist and corporate logics are more likely 
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to prefer continuous learning model of training. Although some exceptional studies have 
tried to explain how different how logics blend, such attempts have remained scarce. For 
example, Glynn & Lounsbury (2005) studied how the aesthetic logic that traditionally 
informs the practices of the symphony and the commercially oriented market logic 
blended with each other in the context of Atlanta Symphony Orchestra. This paper 
follows the footsteps of Glynn and Lounsbury by explaining logic blending in the 
international context of firm-government interaction.       
 
2.5.1 Implications for International Business 
The premise of the institutional logics perspective that institutions are 
simultaneously material and symbolic makes it distinct from neo-institutional 
frameworks used in international business (Busenitz, Gomez, & Spencer, 2000; Kostova 
& Roth, 2002). In this regard, institutional logics are more than regulative, normative, 
and cognitive structures that impose predictable patterns of behavior through legal and 
social sanctions, or cultural indoctrination. Logics shape behavior not due to the coercive, 
normative, and mimetic pressures they exert, but because logics define actors’ interests 
and enable them to pursue their objectives in a certain way. In this sense, institutions are 
providers of resources and capabilities that allow its constituents to undertake some 
activities more successfully than others (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). The implication of this 
for firm-government interaction is that political connectedness occurs in emerging 
countries not because it is highly valued by people or imposed by law, but because it is a 
capability which firms employ when they interact with the government. 
The notion of duality also distinguishes institutional logics approach from the new 
institutional economics in international business, which is based on the premise that 
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formal institutions determine firms’ strategic choices by providing the incentive 
structures (Peng, 2003; Wan, 2005). According to the school of new institutional 
economics in international business, corruption and political ties occur in emerging 
countries considerably more than developed countries, because the benefits they provide 
exceed their costs in contexts where weaker formal institutions is associated with lower 
costs of engaging in such practices (Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
From an institutional logics perspective, this explanation overlooks the role of informal 
norms and meanings associated with strategic action. This is not to say that institutional 
logics perspective does not recognize the importance of formal institutions in explaining 
behavior. In fact, it suggests that symbolic constructions do not make sense if the material 
world is not appropriately constructed. Transition economies epitomize such a situation. 
For example, the notion of an arm’s length transaction does not hold in Eastern Europe, 
where formal institutions that enforce contracts remain weak (Buchan, 2009). However, 
institutional logics approach also suggests that deployment of material resources alone 
cannot organize people’s lives if they do not find correspondence in society’s shared 
beliefs and understandings. For example, exchanges in Japan are still facilitated by 
relational networks rather than contract laws, despite the strong rule of law in this 
country. This is because strong formal institutions associated with contract enforcement 
cannot make rule-based, impersonal contracting a common practice in Japan if Japanese 
people’s propensity to trust others remains low (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). New 
institutional economics approach in international business, in this regard, mostly focuses 
on “the observable”, and neglects “the unobservable”, e.g. subtle meanings that underlie 
formal structures and common practices.  
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Institutional logics approach has also implications for the broader economic 
perspective in international business, which solely emphasizes the role of incentive 
structures as the primary cause of corruption and political connectedness. Regardless of 
the differences in the antecedents of the incentives – either formal institutions or pure 
market forces –, all economic perspectives converge on the assumption that actors engage 
in corruption and political connections mainly because they have interest in doing so. 
However, institutional logics approach suggests that there are no objective incentives that 
can be understood independently of actors’ understandings. Institutional logics shape 
both the ends to which their behavior should be directed, and the means by which those 
ends are achieved (Friedland & Alford, 1991). In this sense, logics shape the rules by 
which utility is defined and pursued. As a result, incentives are not universal, but rather 
contingent on institutions.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This perspective paper addressed two research questions: 1) What draws the 
boundary that separates legitimate and illegitimate exchanges between firms and 
governments?, and 2) how does this boundary differ across countries? The essay drew on 
the institutional logics perspective to answer the questions. In this regard, I argued that 
people use logics to distinguish a legitimate form of firm-government interaction from an 
illegitimate one. Specifically, I proposed that informal, personal exchanges between firms 
and governments, i.e. political connectedness, is illegitimate under market logic and state 
logic, whereas it is legitimate under family and community logic. In order to answer the 
second research question, I explained the differences between developed countries and 
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emerging countries in the way that firms and governments interact with each other. In 
this respect, I argued that political connectedness in emerging countries arises from the 
interplay among four institutional orders: the market, the state, the family, and the 
community, which together generate a patrimonial logic. In developed countries, on the 
other hand, state logic and market logic come together to generate bureaucratic logic, 
which pervades the institutional systems of these countries, and insulates the logics of the 
family and the community from the domain of firm-government relations. This results in 
the prevalence of formal, impersonal exchanges between firms and governments in 
developed countries.  
 
NOTES 
 
1
 i.e. voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption. 
2
 In fact, no country’s system in the world is either purely state or purely market driven. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
4
5 
Table 2.1: Institutional orders that shape firm-government interaction, adapted from Thornton, Ocasio, & Lounsbury (2012) 
 
 
 
 Market  State  Family  Community  
Basis of strategy  Self-interest  Social well-being  Family reputation & 
honor  
Community status  
Strategy  Commodification of 
human activity  
Rationalization and 
regulation of human 
activity  
Motivation of human 
activity for unconditional 
obligations  
Motivation of human 
activity for reciprocal 
obligations  
Control 
mechanisms  
Rational, impersonal, 
universal  
Formal, rational, 
impersonal, universal  
Informal,  
non-rational, personal, 
particularistic  
Informal,  
non-rational, personal, 
particularistic  
Source of authority  Possession of ownership  Bureaucratic hierarchies  Patriarchal domination  Commitment to 
community values & 
ideology  
Source of legitimacy  Economic performance, 
share price  
Democratic participation  Unconditional loyalty  Unity of will, trust & 
reciprocity  
Source of identity  Faceless  Citizenship in nation  Family membership  Community membership  
Economic system  Market capitalism  Welfare capitalism  Family capitalism  Cooperative capitalism  
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Table 2.2: Institutional logics and corresponding remedies for corruption 
 
 Market logic  
(Economic 
remedies) 
State logic  
(Legal remedies) 
Blend of market 
logic and state logic  
Corresponding 
solutions to 
remedy 
corruption  
-Mass privatization  
-Market liberalization 
-Trade liberalization 
-Macro-stabilization 
-Economic 
development 
-Competitive wages 
for government 
officials 
-Nothing (Corruption 
allows supply and 
demand to operate)  
-Punitive laws 
-Strict regulations 
-Protection of 
property and 
contractual rights 
-Bureaucratic 
monitoring 
mechanisms 
 
-Different 
combinations of 
economic and legal 
remedies 
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Table 2.3: Varieties of firm-government interactions, adapted from Faccio (2006) 
and Sun et al. (2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formal exchanges Informal exchanges  
Political action committees Personal ties between corporate 
executives and politicians or 
government officials (e.g. kinship, 
friendship) 
Lobbying entities 
 
Personal ties between politicians and 
firms (e.g. politicians sitting on 
corporate boards) 
 
Inter-organizational ties between firms 
and political institutions (e.g. joint 
ventures between public firms and 
state owned enterprises) 
Personal ties between corporate 
executives and political institutions 
(e.g. executives appointed as 
politicians) 
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Table 2.4: Blends of logics across countries 
 
Developed countries Emerging countries 
Market logic Strong Weak 
State logic Strong Weak 
Family logic Weak Strong 
Community logic Weak Strong 
 
 
    Bureaucratic logic       Patrimonial logic  
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Macro  
(Society) 
 
 
 
 
Micro 
(Organizational/ 
Individual) 
 
 Figure 2.1: Cross-level model of institutional logics, adapted from Thornton et al. 
(2012)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional 
Logics 
Structures and 
Common Practices 
Enacting 
Logics 
Learning 
Logics 
Sensemaking Action 
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Figure 2.2: Interplay among institutional logics across countries 
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Developed 
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Emerging 
Countries 
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CHAPTER 3 
MAKING SENSE OF POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS: CORRUPTION 
OR STRATEGY? 
 
 
3.1. Motivation 
 JPMorgan Chase hired the son of a former Chinese banking regulator who is 
now the chairman of the China Everbright Group, a state-controlled financial 
conglomerate. After the chairman’s son came on board, JPMorgan secured 
multiple coveted assignments from the Chinese conglomerate, including 
advising a subsidiary of the company on a stock offering. 
 
 The Hong Kong office of JPMorgan hired the daughter of a Chinese 
railway official when The China Railway Group, a state-controlled 
construction company that builds railways for the Chinese government, was 
in the process of selecting JPMorgan to advise on its plans to become a 
public company. With JPMorgan’s help, China Railway raised more than 
$5 billion when it went public in 2007. (New York Times, 2013) 
 
Such hiring practices by JP Morgan in China epitomize the role of political 
connectedness in emerging countries. In this regard, the incentive for corporations to 
become politically connected has been recognized among scholars. The source of such 
value is not limited to preferential treatment by state-owned enterprises or the 
government, but also includes lighter taxation, relaxed regulatory oversight, or stiffer 
regulatory oversight of its rivals (Faccio, 2006). Given its importance, some international 
business scholars conceptualize political connectedness as a non-market capability that 
yields competitive advantage in emerging countries, where such practices are prevalent 
(Kim, Kim, & Hoskisson, 2010; Peng, 2003; Wan, 2005). These scholars view political
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connectedness in emerging markets in economic and relational terms, and therefore frame 
them as an opportunity for firms. 
Yet, forming direct or indirect ties to foreign government officials poses 
challenges to multinational enterprises from developed countries. Because such 
practices violate the legal and social norms in their home countries, developed country 
firms are likely to face legal and social sanctions if they engage in political 
connectedness abroad (Rodriguez et al., 2005; Spencer & Gomez, 2011). Thus, 
political connectedness may hurt a developed country firm’s legitimacy not only in 
their home countries, but all around the world (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). For 
instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission opened an anti-bribery into JP 
Morgan’s hiring practices in China. Further, this investigation, along with the hiring 
practices themselves, is extensively reported by the global media, which negatively 
affects the JP Morgan’s international reputation. In this respect, the international 
business literature on corruption conceptualizes political connectedness in social 
terms, and frames them as a threat to firms. 
These two perspectives show that political connectedness creates a dilemma 
for multinationals. On one hand, political connectedness seems to be an important 
source of competitive advantage in many emerging countries. On the other hand, if 
uncovered, it may hurt a firm’s legitimacy. In this sense, managers of multinationals 
need to take into account both strategic imperatives and legitimacy concerns when 
managing their firm’s political ties. However, the academic literature has yet to 
combine these two perspectives in developing a holistic analysis of these issues. For 
instance, the corruption literature usually explores the case of a direct bribe between 
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economic and political actors (Bardhan, 1997; Kaufmann, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Schleifer & Vishny, 1993), without exploring the types of long-term inter-personal 
relationships such as those that JP Morgan sought to build in China. 
 This essay bridges this gap in the literature by looking at both economic and 
social aspects of political connectedness. Specifically, I look at the decision making 
processes by which local and expatriate managers in emerging countries come to 
define the boundaries between political connectedness and corruption. Thus, instead 
of trying to define an objective measure of when political connectedness turns into 
corruption, I aim to understand the way that decision makers themselves subjectively 
perceive, interpret, and respond to political connectedness in emerging countries: 
 
Research Question 1: How do expatriate managers in emerging countries make 
sense of political connectedness? 
 
Research Question 2: How does the way expatriate managers make sense of 
political connectedness affect firm strategy? 
 
The conceptual framework that I develop to answer these questions, i.e. 
institutional sensemaking, explains the cognitive underpinnings of responses to political 
connectedness, thereby contributing to the institutional logics literature, which does not 
directly examine the cognitive mechanisms that link institutions with firm strategy. 
Moreover, the framework explains the institutional antecedents of sensemaking, thereby 
contributing to the managerial sensemaking literature, which does not take into account 
the impact of the wider social structures and beliefs on the cognitive processes occurring 
at the managerial-level.  
This essay also has important practical implications because it will help managers 
be aware of distinction between their own preexisting knowledge systems, i.e. the 
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bureaucratic logic prevailing in their home countries, and the patrimonial logic prevailing 
in emerging countries. Consequently, managers can avoid biases both toward and against 
emerging countries, and better understand business phenomena in these countries. This 
will enable managers to develop appropriate strategic responses to the challenges they 
face in emerging countries, which will not only contribute to the economic performance 
of the multinationals they run, but also to that of the emerging countries in which they 
operate.  
 
3.2 Literature Review   
As explained earlier, there are two separate streams of research in international 
business related to political connectedness. On one hand, there is a literature that labels 
political connectedness as corruption or bribery (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Meschi, 2009; 
Spencer & Gomez, 2011; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). This research stream reflects a social 
perspective, and hence focuses on the legal and moral aspects of political connectedness. 
For example, Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) demonstrates that firms from countries with laws 
against bribery abroad are less likely to enter countries with high levels of corruption. 
Spencer & Gomez (2011) find that multinationals from countries with lower-levels of 
corruption engage in less bribery abroad. Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) show that 
multinationals are more likely to enter into joint ventures with local firms when they 
enter emerging markets with higher levels of corruption. Meschi (2009) documents that 
the more corrupt the host country is, the less likely multinationals are to terminate joint 
ventures with local firms. As these empirical findings show, this literature suggests that 
firms make sense of political connectedness as corruption and therefore try to avoid it. 
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On the other hand, there is a separate literature on political connectedness, which 
reflects an economic perspective. This literature thus focuses on the economic and 
relational aspects of political connectedness. Scholars in this literature use labels such as 
“political capital” (Yiu & Lau, 2008), “political embeddedness” (Sun et al., 2010), and 
“political networks” (Peng, 2003), to refer to the political connectedness phenomenon. 
Moreover, the empirical findings in this literature suggest that political connectedness is a 
source of competitive advantage in emerging markets. For example, Peng and Luo (2000) 
find political connectedness to be positively associated with firm performance in China, 
whereas Faccio (2006) shows that political connectedness increases firm value around the 
world. Similarly, Yiu & Lau (2008) demonstrate that political connectedness positively 
affects product and organizational innovation, as well as domestic and international 
venturing. Finally, Claessens et al. (2008) document that political connectedness 
increases stock returns in Brazil. Overall, this literature suggests that firms make sense of 
political connectedness as a source of competitive advantage, and therefore try to 
increase political connectedness. 
As this review demonstrates, the international business literature concerning 
political connectedness portrays a black and white picture of political connectedness: 
Firms either make sense of political connectedness as corruption and avoid it, or make 
sense of political connectedness as strategy and they do it. In other words, the 
international business literature does not offer a complete picture of political 
connectedness, thereby failing to address the conflicting pressures that multinationals like 
JP Morgan face when they operate in countries such as China. This is because firm 
strategy, in the field of international business, has been generally explained based on 
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either techno-economic or institutional factors. In this regard, the techno-economic 
factors are emphasized by the economic perspective, which views firm strategy as a 
rational, interest-seeking response to incentives, whereas the institutional factors are 
stressed by the social perspective, which regards firm strategy as an irrational, 
endorsement-seeking response to legitimacy pressures. Despite the apparent contrasts 
between these two views, both presume that actors narrowly pursuit mechanical quests. 
Both consider firm strategy to be a function of exogenous, objective pressures, detached 
from firm’s decision makers, who are actually the ones that formulate strategic responses 
(Dacin et al., 2002; George, Chattopadhyay, Sitkin, & Barden, 2006; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Nadkarni & Barr; 2008). According to those two 
views, firms are swept along by economic and institutional pressures, or in other words, 
run by them, not by people. Organizational decision makers, in this sense, are considered 
as nothing but faceless abstractions (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995). Thus, very little is known 
about how actors’ sensemaking of the strategic issues affect their responses to them. In 
order to address these shortcomings in the international business literature, I draw on the 
managerial sensemaking literature (Daft & Weick, 1984; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982).  
 
3.3 Theoretical Background 
 
3.3.1 Managerial Sensemaking 
The sensemaking literature suggests that organizational responses to 
environmental events are shaped by a sequential, tripartite cognitive process, consisting 
of attention, interpretation, and action (Daft & Weick, 1984; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). 
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The first stage of the sensemaking process is attention, through which actors recognize 
and gather raw information about a new issue, or miss and ignore it altogether. Attention, 
in this sense, represents one’s field of vision: information that falls outside this field goes 
unnoticed (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Once an issue penetrates the filters (field of 
vision), however, the raw information is given meaning. This constitutes the 
interpretation stage, at which issues are framed or labeled. Then issues are categorized 
based on the labels attached to them (Dutton & Jackson, 1987). In this regard, two of the 
most salient labels or frames that are used for categorization are “threat” and 
“opportunity” (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; George et al., 2006; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 
1993). Finally, action is the process in which those frames are acted upon and cause-
effect relationships are put into practice (Daft & Weick, 1984). Decision makers who 
frame an issue differently generate a different set of action responses. For example, the 
sensemaking literature suggests that threat framing causes rigidity in decision making 
that restricts strategic repertoire, whereas opportunity framing promotes risk-taking that 
enhances it (George et al., 2006; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981; Thomas et al., 
1993).    
Although the sensemaking literature has articulated the cognitive mechanisms that 
mediate responses to environmental issues and events (Daft & Weick, 1984; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Nadkarni & Perez, 2007; Nadkarni et al., 2011), it has overlooked the 
impact of institutions on these cognitive mechanisms. In this sense, the sensemaking 
literature has typically adopted a decontextualized view of sensemaking, assuming that 
the tripartite cognitive process occurs independently of the environment (Barr, Stimpert, 
& Huff, 1992; Caproni et al., 1992; Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber, 2001; Daft, 
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Sormunen, & Parks, 1988; Garg, Walters, & Priem, 2003; Jackson & Dutton, 1988; 
Plambeck & Weber, 2009; Roth, 1995; Thomas et al., 1993) - although some exceptional 
studies have looked at the role of the industry or the cultural environment in shaping 
sensemaking (Barr & Glynn, 2004; Calori et al., 1994; Elenkov, 1997; May, Stewart, & 
Sweo, 2000; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008) -. As a result, the sensemaking literature has paid 
little attention to how organizational and managerial cognition is influenced by wider 
societal beliefs and structures (i.e. institutions at the macro level), and hence has 
overlooked the role of institutions as being the antecedent of individual and managerial 
cognition. In order to address this shortcoming of the managerial sensemaking literature, 
I draw on the institutional logics perspective (Thornton et al., 2012). 
 
3.3.2 Institutional Sensemaking 
Despite its contributions to our understanding of how institutions at the macro-
level affect strategic action at the organizational and individual level, the institutional 
logics perspective has not elaborated on the cognitive mechanisms through which actors 
perceive, interpret, and act upon institutional prescriptions. Empirical studies drawing on 
the institutional logics perspective have only inferred such cognitive mechanisms, rather 
than directly examining them.  
I address this void in the institutional logics literature by integrating the micro-
level model of tripartite sensemaking with the cross-level model of institutional logics to 
develop a new conceptual framework, which I call institutional sensemaking. This 
framework explains 1) how institutional logics that firms and their decision makers learn 
and incorporate shape the way they make sense of the structures and common practices 
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that they face in emerging countries, and 2) how their sensemaking shapes their responses 
to those structures and common practices.  
According to this framework, institutional logics enter the tripartite sensemaking 
process at the individual and organizational level as preexisting knowledge systems 
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), and affect all three stages. First, institutional logics shape 
attention (the type and amount of information actors gather about issues) by providing a 
set of implicit rules that regulate which issues, strategic contingencies, or problems 
become important. The meaning of an issue is not inherent in this raw information, 
however. Information is subsequently interpreted and infused with meanings (Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987). Therefore, it is neither the issue itself, nor the information gathered about 
the issue, but the interpreted information (the meanings attached to the issue), that shapes 
how the issues is acted upon. In this sense, Bettis and Prahalad (1995) distinguish raw 
information from appropriate actionable knowledge: A flood of information has no value 
if actors cannot appropriately interpret and act upon it. In this regard, logics provide 
frames such as threat and opportunity through which meaning is imposed on the 
information gathered about a strategic issue (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). Third, logics affect 
action by providing range and type of behavior alternatives that can be conceived of, and 
that are considered appropriate (Thornton, 2004). When logics are socially shared and 
acted upon by the majority of society, the material aspects of institutions, i.e. structures 
and common practices come about. Institutional logics thus constitute the 
symbolic/cognitive foundation of the structures and common practices in a society.     
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3.4 Deconstructing the international business literature on political connectedness 
by using the institutional sensemaking framework 
A careful reading of the international business literature related to political 
connectedness through the lens of institutional sensemaking reveals that the two separate 
research streams discussed earlier actually embody opposing logics. On one hand, the 
literature on corruption embodies bureaucratic logic. Under this logic, managerial 
attention will be directed to the legal and moral aspects of political connectedness. 
Therefore, managers will frame political connectedness as a threat, and hence will seek to 
avoid political connectedness. On the other hand, the literature on political connectedness 
embodies patrimonial logic. Under this logic, managerial attention will be directed to the 
economic and relational aspects of political connectedness. Therefore, managers will 
frame political connectedness as an opportunity, and hence will seek to increase political 
connectedness. In short, the deconstruction of these two literatures show how the two 
dissimilar logics differently shape the way managers make sense of and respond to 
political connectedness, as shown in Table 3.1. This theorization is also illustrated by the 
model of institutional sensemaking of political connectedness in Table 3.2 and Figure 
3.3. 
As the model of institutional sensemaking of political connectedness is based on 
the deconstruction the extant literature, however, it is limited by it. In other words, the 
model still portrays a black and white picture of political connectedness: managers make 
sense of political connectedness either as a threat and avoid it, or as an opportunity and 
do it. Such an either or neither nor sensemaking and response arising from two dissimilar 
logics fails to offer a complete explanation of political connectedness.  
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Sensemaking scholars, however, have highlighted the importance of cognitive 
complexity for addressing multiple conflicting pressures (Caproni et al., 1992; Calori et 
al., 1994; Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). Cognitive complexity is defined as the degree of 
differentiation and integration within a cognitive structure (Bartunek , Gordon, & 
Weathersby, 1983). In other words, it reflects the breadth and depth of the knowledge 
embedded in it (Calori et al., 1994). Differentiation represents the ability to perceive 
several dimensions in a stimulus array, whereas integration corresponds to the 
development of complex connections among the differentiated characteristics. In this 
regard, managers high in integration and low in differentiation are able to make use of the 
concepts in their cognitive structures simultaneously to make sense of a stimulus, 
however, they will find it hard to adopt multiple perspectives to that stimulus, as the 
number of concepts they can accommodate is limited. The implication is that managers 
high in integration but low in differentiation lack the variability and flexibility to learn 
dissimilar logics. On the other hand, managers high in differentiation and low in 
integration can hold several perspectives simultaneously, but fail to combine them to 
have a better understanding of the stimulus. Although such managers have the ability to 
adopt multiple perspectives, they lack the cognitive capabilities to link these perspectives 
with each other. The implication is that managers high in differentiation but low in 
integration lack the coherence to blend dissimilar logics. 
The extant literature on cognitive complexity, however, shows that managers with 
cognitive complexity are high in both dimensions, possessing the cognitive capability to 
simultaneously hold and apply several competing and complementary interpretations of 
situations and events (Bartunek et al., 1983). Since these decision-makers can both 
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accommodate more concepts in their cognitive structures and link these concepts with 
each other, they can understand issues from multiple perspectives, and can 
simultaneously synthesize these perspectives to form a holistic view. The implication is 
that managers with cognitive complexity can learn dissimilar logics and blend these 
logics with each other. 
In order to further our understanding of the interplay among institutional 
sensemaking, cognitive complexity, and political connectedness, a field research was 
conducted in China. The methodology used in this field research and the insights gained 
into the political connectedness phenomenon in China are explained below. 
 
3.5 Methodology 
 
3.5.1 Sample 
As part of the field research, I interviewed fourteen expatriate managers in China. 
The interviews took place between August and October 2015. Of the fourteen expatriate 
managers, two were American, two were Canadian, two were Australian, one was 
British, one was German, one was Singaporean, and one was Japanese. Thus, all the 
expatriate managers were from countries where bureaucratic logic is prevalent 
(Fukuyama, 1995; Fukuyama, 2001; Fukuyama, 2011). Five expatriates were mid-level 
managers, whereas the rest of them either owned businesses in China or were the country 
managers of some American and Canadian multinationals. Three expatriate managers 
were based in Beijing, while all the others were based in Shanghai. The firms which 
expatriate managers worked for operated in a variety of industries, ranging from medical 
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device wholesale trade and consulting to logistics and commercial photography, thereby 
reducing the risk that my findings may be specific to certain industries or sectors. 
I obtained access to the expatriate managers mostly by attending the American 
Chamber of Commerce events in Shanghai. Only the Australian and Singaporean 
participants, as well as one American participant, were accessed through existing 
personal connections. As is typical of this type of qualitative research, the resultant 
sample is neither totally random, nor is complete (McCracken, 1988; Witt & Redding, 
2009).  
 
3.5.2 Interviews 
I obtained data from my sample of managers through in depth, semi-structured 
interviews, in which I used a scenario as a stimulus material to prompt participants to talk 
about such a sensitive topic as political connectedness. This is a common method used in 
ethnographic research (McCracken, 1988). Although the scenario was fictional, it was 
based on JP Morgan’s hiring practices in China. The scenario is as follows: 
“Bob, the executive of the ABC company, hires a young college graduate 
named Xiaoqiang, who is qualified for the position. However, Bob 
chooses Xiaoqiang over more qualified candidates because Xiaoqiang's 
father is a senior government official. Some time after the hiring, 
Xiaoqiang's father takes charge of a government contract, in which the 
ABC company is one of the bidders. Xiaoqiang's father awards the 
contract to the ABC company, despite receiving more competitive bids 
from the ABC's rivals.” 
 
I gave this scenario to the participants and asked them to evaluate the practices 
described in it. This method allowed the participants to distance themselves from the 
characters and their behavior stated in the scenario. Thus, although the participants did 
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not have to share their personal experiences with me, they revealed their personal 
opinions about political connectedness when they evaluated the scenario.  
 
3.5.3 Data 
The interviews were all audio-recorded and transcribed. All the interviews were 
conducted in English and were transcribed by myself. It was these transcribed interview 
texts that comprised the data for eliciting managerial sensemaking.      
 In order to measure managerial sensemaking, I content analyzed the transcribed 
interview texts by using NVivo software. The content analysis involved coding the 
phrases and sentences that manifest attention focus and framing of political 
connectedness based on the model of institutional sensemaking of political 
connectedness. Thus, texts that manifest an attention focus on the legal and moral aspects 
of political connectedness were coded under a separate node from those that reflect an 
attention focus on the economic and relational aspects. Similarly, texts that manifest a 
threat framing of political connectedness were coded under a separate node from those 
that reflect an opportunity framing. Table 3.4 shows the sample sentences used for 
coding. 
 
3.6 Content Analysis 
Attention focus on legal and moral aspects of political connectedness were not 
coded independently, because the participants most of the time did not separate the two in 
the interviews. Legal remarks were usually followed by moral remarks, and vice versa. In 
this sense, legal and moral dimensions were intertwined: What is legally wrong was also 
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considered to be also morally wrong by the participants, which led to the negative 
framing of political connectedness. This in turn generated the intention to avoid political 
connectedness. 
“I am the legal rep of my company. If anything goes wrong in my 
company they can throw me in the jail or send me back to Canada. So if 
you are the legal rep, the legal rep is responsible for whatever the people 
do. The expat that was a legal rep for …, a big mining company, he is now 
in prison here. Two years ago he was convicted for paying bribes and he is 
Australian, but originally from China, Chinese-Australian, he is now 
prison. He was the legal rep. The more they prosecute I think it will help 
but it still goes on because everybody says I am not going to get caught.” 
(Expatriate manager G) 
 
As can be seen in this excerpt of the interview, the Canadian manager directs his 
attention to the legal dimension. He particularly emphasizes the role of punitive laws in 
anti-corruption efforts by showing some potential legal consequences for receiving 
bribes. At this point, he clearly labels political connectedness as bribery, and hence 
frames it in negative terms. This was a common pattern among the expatriate 
participants: Attention to the legal aspects leads the managers to label political 
connectedness as corruption, and to frame it as a threat. As a result, they intend to avoid 
political connectedness. Here is another example: 
“You cannot really promise something or offer something or receive 
anything that shows you get a financial benefit other than just the contract 
that you have. We cannot do anything like that. And if we were in a 
partnership with a firm here, and they did it, that is ground for breaking 
the contract. We cannot do that. We just cannot afford to do that. They are 
very strict here in China about corruption. They put people in jail here.” 
(Expatriate manager F) 
 
Attention to the moral dimension similarly leads the participants to refer to 
political connectedness as corruption or bribery and to frame it in negative terms. As 
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another Canadian manager based in Shanghai puts it, hiring employees based on their 
political connections is morally wrong and hence should be avoided:  
“This is unethical [hiring Xiaoqiang], especially for a multinational 
company. Because we should hire people not based on their relationships 
or family backgrounds, but we should hire people based on their 
competence, or on their knowledge of the product.” (Expatriate manager 
H) 
 
As can be seen, attention focus on the principle that people should be hired based 
on their qualifications leads to the perception that political connectedness is immoral. In 
fact, the same country manager equates hiring politically connected employees to giving 
bribes, which he says is very common in the healthcare industry, where his company 
operates. In this regard, he frames political connectedness as a threat not only to his 
company, but also to social welfare. This leads to the conclusion that political 
connectedness is something that should not only be avoided, but also be fought against: 
“…we should do the right thing in this country, and provide a very good 
service to the patient. Because if corruption happens, the patient will get a 
very expensive product, which is not worth it. Because some part of the 
price or profit will go to some people’s pockets, which is not good. So if 
everything is clean, transparent, then the patient can enjoy the lowest 
price, and the doctor will also not have any trouble using your product. 
The companies will also be happy because they can provide the best 
service directly to the patient without having to pay money to doctors, 
which is illegal. So companies will also be happy. Everyone will be 
happy. The government will be happy, so why don’t we do that? We 
should clean this market. We should do the right thing so that the patient 
can enjoy a very good product and they can have a better life in China.” 
(Expatriate manager H) 
 
Economic and relational aspects of political connectedness, similar to the legal 
and moral aspects, were often not seen as independent from each other by the 
participants. Participants suggested either that political connectedness brings benefits 
only when a personal relationship is involved, or that when there is a personal 
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relationship with a government official then there will be benefits. Because economic and 
relational aspects were intertwined, just like legal and moral aspects, they were not coded 
separately.  
“…you see very clearly that Chinese companies or multinationals that 
develop stronger kind of personal relationships with government officials 
are often going to win projects at a much higher rate than other companies. 
In my previous job, I would sometimes submit bids for various projects, 
and regardless of how qualified our bid was, we never won because we 
often did not have the right government connections.” (Expatriate manager 
A)  
 
This expatriate manager thus sees a positive association between networks with 
government officials and business outcomes. In this respect, she focuses his attention to 
the economic and relational aspects of political connectedness, which leads him to frame 
political connectedness as an opportunity. As a result, she suggests companies should hire 
people like Xiaoqiang if they want to operate in China. This is a clear manifestation of 
patrimonial logic. Overall, the content analysis of the interviews provides support for the 
model of institutional sensemaking of political connectedness. 
 
3.7 Blending dissimilar logics of firm-government interaction 
  The field research suggests that patrimonial logic has a strong presence in China. 
Expatriate managers consistently said in the interviews that the practice of hiring 
politically connected people to win business is commonplace in China, and that most 
companies have well-connected employees.  
 As a result, most of the expatriate managers have come to think that political 
connectedness is essential in for companies to operate in China, and they do not consider 
it necessarily as corruption. In other words, most of the expatriate managers have learned 
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patrimonial logic: They have begun to focus their attention more on the economic and 
relational aspects of political connectedness, and hence to frame it as an opportunity. In 
this respect, an expatriate manager thought that it was normal for candidates’ political 
connections to be considered as a factor in hiring decisions. He did not perceive it as 
corruption.    
  “It is the same in everything. You want to go to see a concert and if you 
know someone you have got cheaper tickets, everything is like that in 
China. The government, every little thing. Just the way the country works. 
And it is the way the country has worked for a thousand years. And once 
you know, once you understand that, and you realize that nothing is black 
and white and anything is possible as long as you know the right 
people…” (Expatriate manager K)  
 
  Similarly, another expatriate manager acknowledges that connections in the 
Chinese government design institutes may play a role when he hires Chinese salespeople 
for his clients. In fact, he sometimes asks candidates about their political connections 
during job interviews: 
“…we have talked about relationships with [Chinese government design] 
institutes and things like that. Because you need to go in present your 
technology, they need to at least endorse it, like it, and say it is alright for 
Chinese companies to use us. In a case like that, that could factor to our 
decisions. All else being equal, somebody with a good network within the 
Chinese design institutes for a certain industry might have advantages over 
the other candidate that we were considering.” (Expatriate manager E) 
 
  Thus, expatriates have learned patrimonial logic while in China and have come to 
see political connectedness as a necessary component of their operations in China rather 
than a corrupt practice. Yet, they have not totally adopted patrimonial logic either. They 
instead integrate the bureaucratic logic of their home country with the patrimonial logic 
of their host country to develop a hybrid logic. In other words, expatriates have come to 
find a middle ground. As an expatriate manager puts it:    
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 “Since we are in the middle, we try to find a balance between the two 
worlds, a balance point that works for both sides…As a company that 
represents American companies, and also as American we cannot give 
cash gifts but we can still show respect, we can still maybe entertain them 
a little bit taking them to dinner and give face, and try to appease them and 
befriend them in the Chinese way, without crossing the limits that are 
placed upon us because we are dealing with an American company and we 
are an American company, you understand? So we have to operate in kind 
of within two worlds. There is overlap, there are certain things you cannot 
do as an American company, there certain things they expect as a Chinese 
company, but we cannot always give it to them. But there are other things 
this is good in China and it is OK for us to do that as an American 
company so we are able to find that middle ground in a very Chinese way, 
give them respect and convince them that this is in their best interest, and 
give them face and whatever and get them to ally.” (Expatriate manager E)  
 
 Thus, unlike the black and white picture portrayed by the literature, expatriate 
managers in China operate in a gray area. They avoid the black area, i.e. patrimonial 
logic, in which the practices are blatantly illegal and blatantly immoral in their home 
countries. In this sense, expatriate managers direct their attention to the legal and moral 
aspects of political connectedness. Yet, they are not committed to be in the white area 
either. This is because they at the same time want to be able to operate and perform well 
in their host country, which is not possible without political connectedness. In this sense, 
they also direct their attention to the economic and relational aspects of political 
connectedness. This leads them to frame political connectedness in both negative and 
positive terms. Thus, although they do not consider political connectedness necessarily as 
corruption, they think it can turn into corruption. In other words, they draw a boundary 
that separates between political connectedness and corruption, or between good political 
ties and bad political ties. In this regard, it is important to know how they draw this 
boundary, or the boundaries of the gray area shown in Figure 3.4. 
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 The content analysis of interviews suggests that two factors affect how the 
expatriate managers distinguish political connectedness from corruption: 1) The intent to 
build and use political ties, and 2) The way these ties are utilized. As for the former, if the 
intent is to gain access, or to open doors, then political connectedness is not considered 
corruption. If the intent, however, is to gain an influence to get an unfair advantage, then 
political connectedness becomes illegal and immoral. As for the second factor, i.e. the 
way political ties are utilized, if exchange of favors between firms and governments 
occurs naturally, as part of a personal relationship, expatriate managers do not consider 
political connectedness as corruption. If the exchange of favors, however, occurs as part 
of a transactional relationship, then expatriate managers view political connectedness as 
both illegal and immoral:         
“As long as nothing was agreed to, either favors exchanged or promises of 
future contracts, then no, I would not see it as any problem if hiring him. 
In fact, I would see as part of his qualifications the fact that his dad IS a 
government official. Because he would say good things about our 
company at dinner, and that would be a good thing for us, and very 
influential. I would think it was wrong though if the dad asked us to hire 
his son and we agreed and we later came back to the dad, and were trying 
to a get a favor returned to us. That is very common practice in China 
called guanxi. And also I would think it was wrong if the dad hired us to 
work on a government project, and then his son got a commission or a 
kickback, or some kind of boost in salary because of that. That is also very 
common in China and that would be wrong. That would be illegal in the 
USA and wrong in the USA. If the son was not qualified for the job, and 
we hired him anyway, again I would think that is wrong. But again, that 
happens all the time in China.”  (Expatriate manager B) 
 
 Similar to this, the country manager of a Canadian multinational in Shanghai 
distinguishes using political connectedness to gain access from corruption or bribery. 
According to him, there is nothing wrong with the former: 
“It is normal to hire somebody who is very well-connected. But, why do 
you want those connections? You want those connections to help you do 
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some business or to get some access, but you have to do that without 
giving bribes.” (Expatriate manager G)  
 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
In this essay, I addressed two research questions: 1) How do expatriate managers 
in emerging countries make sense of political connectedness?, and 2) how does the way 
expatriate managers make sense of political connectedness affect firm strategy? To 
answer these questions, I combined the institutional logics and tripartite sensemaking 
frameworks, and developed the model of institutional sensemaking. This model explained 
how different logics differently shaped the way local and expatriate managers make sense 
of political connectedness in emerging countries. More specifically, I argued that 
bureaucratic logic directs managerial attention to legal and moral aspects of political 
connectedness. As a result, managers frame political connectedness as a threat, and seek 
to avoid political connectedness. On the other hand, patrimonial logic directs managerial 
attention to economic and relational aspects of political connectedness. As a result, 
managers frame political connectedness as an opportunity, and seek to increase political 
connectedness.  
In order to apply and further the model of institutional sensemaking of political 
connectedness, I conducted field research in China and interviewed 14 expatriate 
managers. The insights gained from this field research provided support for the 
framework. The research also demonstrated that expatriate managers blend the 
bureaucratic logic of their home country with the patrimonial logic of their host country 
logic to make sense of political connectedness. Under this hybrid logic, expatriates make 
sense of political connectedness as a double edged sword: They focus their attention both 
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on legal/moral and economic/relational aspects of political connectedness, and they frame 
it as both opportunity and threat. As a result, they distinguish political connectedness 
from corruption: They separate legitimate political ties from illegitimate political ties, and 
while they try to increase the former, they seek to avoid the latter.            
 
3.9 Discussion 
  This research provides unique insights into the political connectedness 
phenomenon in China. As opposed to the clear distinction made by the literature between 
the two dissimilar logics of firm-government interaction, the field research demonstrates 
that expatriates in China can learn patrimonial logic prevalent in their host country and 
blend it with the bureaucratic logic prevalent in their home country. The consequent 
hybrid logic directs their attention to both legal/moral and economic/relational aspects of 
political connectedness. This in turn leads to the framing of political connectedness 
simultaneously as a threat and an opportunity. As a result, expatriates in China can make 
more fine-grained distinctions between political connectedness and corruption, forging 
political ties that help them to operate more effectively in their host country without 
violating the legal and ethical norms in their home countries.     
This study shows the importance of managerial sensemaking in studying 
multinationals responses to institutional complexity. Kostova and Zaheer (1999), in this 
regard, provided a model that explains how multinationals operating in complex 
environments respond to the conflicting institutional logics they face. Although Kostova 
and Zaheer primarily focused on the objective characteristics of the institutional 
environment and of the organization, this study documents that organizational responses 
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to institutional pressures depend on managers’ subjective interpretations. Similarly, 
international business scholars have extensively studied whether multinationals from 
developed countries conform to or challenge the dissimilar logics they face in emerging 
countries (Bailey & Spicer, 2007; Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Peng, 
2003; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000). This study explains why there is diversity of 
organizational responses to the institutions in emerging countries, as well as why the 
issue at hand is more complicated than an either or, neither nor choice. By having a finer-
grained understanding of the differences between dissimilar logics, organizations’ 
decision makers can view strategic issues both as a threat and an opportunity, thereby 
managing to carve out a middle ground in the face of the conflicting pressures they 
encounter while they operate in emerging countries.   
Sensemaking scholars are increasingly interested in the phenomenon of cognitive 
complexity (Calori et al., 1994; McNamara, Luce, & Tompson, 2002; Nadkarni & Perez, 
2007; Nadkarni et al., 2011; Plambeck & Weber, 2010). This study shows that cognitive 
complexity explains the role of the cognitive competence of the managers in 
organizational coping with different institutional environments (Calori et al., 1994; 
Nadkarni & Perez, 2007; Nadkarni et al., 2011). In this regard, managers with cognitive 
complexity are not only able to learn and incorporate dissimilar logics, but they are also 
able to integrate these logics and blend them with each other. Studying the complexity of 
the cognitive structures of the managers can thus provide fresh insights into they make 
sense of and respond to political connectedness in emerging countries. In this regard, 
expatriate managers with more complex cognitive structures will probably be more likely 
to learn the patrimonial logic in their host country, and integrate it with the bureaucratic 
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logic they learned in their home country. Therefore, cognitive complexity will enable 
managers to have a better understanding of political connectedness, and will provide with 
them more strategic alternatives than an either or choice between avoiding and engaging 
in political connectedness. Future research should focus on the relationship between 
cognitive complexity/simplicity and responses to dissimilar logics in emerging countries.  
 
3.9.1 Contributions to institutional research in international business  
 “Ten years ago when GE senior managers discussed the global marketplace, they 
talked about the U.S., Europe, Japan, and the rest of the world…Now the ‘rest of world’ 
means the U.S., Europe, and Japan”. (Immelt, Govindarajan, & Trimbleet, 2009: 59)  
This quote, which is taken from an article co-authored by Jeffrey R. Immelt, the 
chief executive officer (CEO) of General Electric, illustrates the general understanding 
emerging among both practitioners and scholars that the future of international business 
lies in emerging countries. In fact, double-digit economic growth is currently an 
emerging country phenomenon and in the past year, for the first time in history, foreign 
direct investment flows were greater to developing economies than developed economies. 
Emerging countries are estimated to contribute to the global economic growth more than 
developed countries (the former 57% as opposed to the latter 43%) during 2010-2020 
(Accenture, 2012), while their multinationals have already begun to outgrow and 
outperform their developed country peers (Boston Consulting Group, 2011).  
As emerging countries and their firms grow and become integrated to the rest of 
the world, however, their institutions remain fundamentally dissimilar to those of 
developed countries (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Peng,Wang, & Jiang, 2008). This makes the 
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impact of emerging country institutions on international business outcomes conspicuous 
(Peng et al., 2008), and increases the need to understand the institutions in emerging 
countries. Consequently, emerging countries and their institutions now preoccupy both 
international business practitioners and scholars (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Immelt et al., 
2009; Kostova et al., 2008; Peng et al., 2009). In fact, the impact of institutions in 
emerging countries on business practices and strategy have been the main driving force 
behind the development of the field of international business in the last decade (Peng et 
al., 2008). 
Despite the considerable advances to date, two factors have inhibited progress in 
our understanding of the relationship between emerging country institutions and 
international business outcomes. First, institutions have been generally treated as 
exogenous regulative, normative, and cultural constraints that determine the behavior of 
individuals and organizations. In this regard, studies on the interior cognitive that explain 
how actors make sense of and respond to the external constraints, have been rare. 
Consequently, international business scholars have not been able to address how 
multinationals’ and their decision makers’ evaluations of, and hence responses to, 
emerging country institutions vary. Second, instead of understanding the emerging 
country phenomena in its local form, scholars have superimposed their pre-existing 
theoretical tools (which were originally developed to explain the relationship between 
institutions and business outcomes in Western contexts) on emerging country contexts 
(Tsui, 2007; Whetten, 2009). In this sense, institutional differences across countries have 
been regarded as differences in degree, rather than differences in kind (Jackson & Deeg, 
2008). As a result, Western market-oriented institutions are taken as the norm, and the 
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emerging country institutions that diverge from this ‘norm’ are implicitly or explicitly 
attached negative labels such as deviant, inferior, inefficient, etc. The outcome is that 
international business scholars have been preoccupied with objectively measuring the 
distance between two countries, as well as the impact of the costs associated with this 
distance on multinationals, which is known as liability of foreignness. As a result, the 
attempts in the field to formulate predictions with respect to how multinationals and their 
decision makers develop appropriate responses to emerging country institutions, and 
successfully navigate through these environments, have been rare.  
This essay addresses these voids in the international business literature by 
providing a fresh perspective in studying such a prevalent emerging country phenomenon 
as political connectedness.  Drawing from the institutional logics approach, my 
dissertation demonstrates that patrimonial logic and bureaucratic logic do not necessarily 
represent fundamentally dissimilar rules according to which the game is played, but they 
are rather guidelines that help actors to successfully play games that are fundamentally 
dissimilar. Therefore, the more firms’ decision makers understand the patrimonial logic 
prevailing in emerging countries - besides the bureaucratic logic prevailing in their home 
countries -, the better they get at playing the dissimilar game in emerging countries, and 
hence the less liability of foreignness they face.  
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Table 3.1: Two perspectives on political connectedness 
 Political Connectedness as Corruption Political Connectedness as Strategy 
Definition “Abuse of public power for private gain”  “Managers’ personal ties with government 
officials” (Peng & Luo, 2000) 
Goal Social endorsement, legitimacy Economic performance, competitive advantage 
Labeling of political 
connectedness  
Corruption 
Bribery 
“Political networks” (Peng, 2003) 
“Political ties” (Li, Zhou, & Shao, 2009) 
“Political capital” (Yiu & Lau, 2008) 
Framing of political 
connectedness 
“Threat” to legitimacy “Opportunity” to gain competitive advantage 
General firm 
strategy 
Compliance, isomorphism 
 
Acquisition of non-market capabilities 
Specific firm 
strategy 
Avoid political connectedness Increase political connectedness 
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Table 3.2: Institutional sensemaking of political connectedness 
 Literature on Corruption Literature on Political 
Connectedness 
Logic Bureaucratic logic Patrimonial logic 
Attention Compliance 
Legal and moral aspects 
Performance 
Economic and relational aspects 
Interpretation “Threat” to legitimacy “Opportunity” to gain economic 
benefits 
Strategy Avoid political connectedness Increase political connectedness 
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Table 3.3: Sample of expatriate managers by location, industry, and nationality 
Identity Location Industry Nationality 
Expatriate manager A Beijing Business consulting American 
Expatriate manager B Shanghai Commercial photography  American 
Expatriate manager C Shanghai Textile American 
Expatriate manager D Shanghai Automobile wholesale trade American 
Expatriate manager E Shanghai Business consulting American 
Expatriate manager F Shanghai Architectural consulting American 
Expatriate manager G Shanghai Business association Canadian 
Expatriate manager H Shanghai Medical equipment wholesale Canadian 
Expatriate manager I Beijing Investment consulting Australian 
Expatriate manager J Beijing Retail e-commerce  Australian 
Expatriate manager K Shanghai Entertainment British 
Expatriate manager L Shanghai Logistics German 
Expatriate manager M Shanghai Translation services Japanese 
Expatriate manager N Beijing Legal consulting Singaporean 
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Table 3.4: Sample sentences used for coding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Attention focus Interpretation 
Legal and moral aspects  Threat framing 
“…the first thing it goes against most 
countries’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
it goes against my country’s, it goes 
against the US’s. So we know that kind of 
behavior is unethical, and immoral.”      
“…This [political connectedness] is just 
temporary. You see in China the 
government changes a lot. One day you 
are still the Mayor, but maybe the next 
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government, the better.” 
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Figure 3.1: Micro-level model of sensemaking, adapted from Daft & Weick (1984) 
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Figure 3.2: Cross-level model of institutional sensemaking 
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Figure 3.3: Model of institutional sensemaking of political connectedness 
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Figure 3.4: Blend of patrimonial logic and bureaucratic logic 
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CHAPTER 4 
INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS, MANAGERIAL SENSEMAKING, AND 
INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGY: MANAGERIAL ATTENTION 
AS THE COGNITIVE UNDERPINNING OF FIRM’S STRATEGIC 
RESPONSES TO DISSIMILAR INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS OF FIRM-
GOVERNMENT INTERACTION 
 
 
When a firm is domestic, its operations are contained within a single home 
country, and therefore it is subject to relatively homogeneous pressures from the 
institutional environment (Nadkarni, Herrman, & Perez, 2011; Roth & Morrison, 1992). 
If the firm’s operations transcend its home country, however, then it faces complex and 
diverse institutional pressures, unlike those found in the home country. Multinationals, in 
this sense, operate in an environment characterized by complexity, ambiguity, and 
equivocality (Kostova et al., 2008). Therefore, top management of multinationals has the 
critical task to provide meaningful interpretations for patterns of ambiguous information 
they receive (Thomas et al., 1993). Consequently, the imposition of meaning on complex 
and ambiguous strategic issues by managers, in other words, managerial sensemaking, 
have come to the forefront of internationalization strategy (Caproni, Lenway, & Murtha, 
1992; George et al., 2006; Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). 
The role of managerial sensemaking becomes particularly paramount where 
competition in emerging countries is considered (Dhanaraj & Khanna, 2011; George et 
al., 2006; Peng, 2003). These countries lack the bureaucratic logic that Western 
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businesses typically rely upon, such as the formal regulatory and legal frameworks that 
encourage predictable patterns of behavior (Tracey & Phillips, 2011). As a result, the 
“rules of the game” are not known, or constantly changing in these countries (Peng, 
Wang, & Jiang, 2008), which creates a great deal of uncertainty for the decision-makers 
of firms (Spicer et al., 2000). The absence or weakness of bureaucratic logic that makes 
and enforces the rules of market competition is known as institutional voids in the 
international business literature (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). It has been argued that the 
way managers make sense of these voids determines whether they recognize and try to 
work around them, or they overlook and seek to avoid them (Dhanaraj & Khanna, 2011; 
George et al., 2006). 
In this regard, previous research on the relationship between institutional 
differences and internationalization strategy has demonstrated that when firms from 
developed countries in which bureaucratic logic is prevalent enter into emerging 
countries in which patrimonial logic is prevalent, they face an institutional environment 
that requires different strategies and capabilities to compete. This situation represents a 
hazard, and might lead these firms to avoid, or at least to reduce commitment in emerging 
countries (Henisz & Delios, 2001; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Phillips et al., 2009; Yiu & 
Makino, 2002; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). In this study, I extend this literature by drawing on 
the institutional research that emphasizes the socio-psychological foundations of 
institutional processes (George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). I argue that the 
strategic responses of developed country firms to institutional differences are not based 
on objective evaluations, but are rather based on how their decision-makers perceive, 
interpret, and act upon them (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). Specifically, I focus on 
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attention as the cognitive process through which managers of developed country firms 
make sense of dissimilar institutional logics. The literature shows that attention patterns 
of managers influence firm’s strategic responses by shaping the way managers notice and 
make sense of their environment (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; Levy, 2005; Nadkarni & 
Perez, 2007). Drawing on this, I argue that multinationals are more likely to expand into 
1) emerging countries when their top management pays more attention to the institutional 
environment; 2) developed countries when their top management pays more attention to 
the market environment. Those who direct their attention more towards the institutional 
environment will be are more likely to develop the strategies and capabilities required by 
patrimonial logic. In other words, these managers have better cognitive capabilities to 
comprehend the “rules of the game” (North, 1990: 3), and “sense and seize opportunities” 
(Teece, 2007: 1341) in emerging countries. Those whose attention is limited to the 
narrow market environment, however, are less likely to develop the strategies and 
capabilities required by patrimonial logic. When they face an institutional system in 
which patrimonial logic is prevalent, they are more likely to see threats, rather than an 
opportunities (Dhanaraj & Khanna, 2011), and hence are less likely to “play the game” in 
emerging countries.  
 This paper’s approach to internationalization strategy has two theoretical 
implications. First, it contributes to the international management literature that focuses 
on the institutional similarities/differences between home and host countries as the main 
determinant of internationalization strategy (Berry, Guillen, & Zhou, 2010; Phillips et al., 
2009; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). By examining the cognitive underpinning of 
internationalization strategy, I explain why firms, despite being embedded in the same 
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institutional environment and being subject to the same institutional pressures, take 
different strategic actions. I argue that internationalization is not just an automatic 
response to objectively measurable institutional differences, but is rather a consequence 
of how the decision makers of firms make sense of these institutional differences. Which 
issues managers give priority to, or focus their attention on, influences the way they 
interpret institutional differences, and this in turn influences the strategic actions they 
take. From this perspective, internationalization can be seen as much a question of 
strategic decision making as of institutional processes.  
Second, this paper contributes to the institutional theory by highlighting the 
cognitive underpinnings of strategic responses to institutional logics. Despite being the 
socio-psychological foundation that institutions rest on (DiMaggio, 1997; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Powell & Colyvas, 2008; Zucker, 1983), cognition has for the most part 
eluded institutional researchers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). The general tendency in 
institutional research has rather been to make self-serving attributions to cognition by 
looking merely at the organizational outcomes (Scott, 2008). This study, on the other 
hand, involves a direct examination of managerial cognition through the measurement of 
attention patterns, which can be seen as a step towards revealing the micro-foundations of 
institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). 
 
4.1 Internationalization as a strategic response to dissimilar institutional logics 
Research in international management has extensively studied the impact of 
institutional differences on country choice strategy. An important finding of this literature 
is that institutional differences between home and host countries make 
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internationalization less likely (Berry et al., 2010; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Henisz 
& Delios, 2001). From an institutional theory perspective, this can be explained by the 
legitimacy issue. In this regard, institutional differences between two countries affect 
internationalization success by posing legitimacy challenges for the multinational 
(Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Lu & Xu, 2006). Especially a large 
institutional distance severely diminishes multinational’s odds for growth and survival in 
the host country, and consequently deters it from investing in that country: 
“…Firms will refrain from investing in markets that are institutionally 
distant, because business activities in those markets require conformity to 
institutional rules and norms that conflict with those of the home country.” 
(Xu & Shenkar, 2002: 614)  
 
Where internationalization from developed countries into emerging countries is 
considered, as is the case in this study, the dissimilar patrimonial logic prevalent in 
emerging countries have the same effect as large institutional distance does (Phillips et 
al., 2009). In this sense, firms from developed countries intrinsically employ market 
strategies and market capabilities to compete in rule-based, stable environments 
supported by bureaucratic logic (Peng, 2003; Wan, 2005). Emerging countries, on the 
other hand, are characterized by uncertainty caused by weak bureaucratic logic (Spicer et 
al., 2000). This prevents developed country firms from pursuing market strategies and 
taking advantage of their market capabilities (Henisz, 2003). Patrimonial logic in these 
countries thus requires firms to employ strategies to manage the institutional environment 
rather than the market environment. However, many firms in developed countries are not 
equipped with the skills, knowledge, and mindsets required to pursuit these strategies 
(Dhanaraj & Khanna, 2011). The incapacity to address institutional differences thus 
poses significant challenges to developed country multinationals.  
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This argument has been supported by previous research, which demonstrates that 
developed country firms tend to respond to patrimonial logic by avoiding entry into 
emerging countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Feinberg & Gupta, 2009; Henisz & 
Delios, 2001). These firms rather expand into other developed countries with similar 
institutional environments, which enable them to utilize their market capabilities. Despite 
providing useful insights into firm internationalization, this institutional account of 
internationalization fails to address the mechanisms through which institutional 
differences cause strategic responses. This is a “deficiency” in institutional theory that 
scholars still attempt to mitigate in current institutional work (Scott, 2008). As explained 
earlier, a direct examination of the cognitive processes that mediate between institutions 
and strategic responses is needed to address this gap, which is the primary objective of 
this study.  
Furthermore, strategic response approach to internationalization has traditionally 
focused on organizations and has neglected managers’ role in formulating organizations’ 
strategic responses. This issue has recently started to receive attention from institutional 
scholars as current work in institutional theory is reconciling with the old institutionalist 
perspective (Selznick, 1957). As a result, managers come to be regarded as the actual 
bearers of the shared understandings within the organization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; 
Hirsch & Lounsbury, 1997). The implication is that how organizations “think” becomes a 
matter of how their key decision-makers “think” (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009), and this is 
what ultimately shapes organizational responses.    
Moreover, firms that internationalize their operations typically operate under the 
jurisdiction of a diverse set of institutions, including dissimilar national environments that 
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are composed of multiple and -as in the case of emerging countries- emerging 
organizational fields. This environment poses a sharp contrast to the highly structured 
environment that is assumed by institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). The international environment thus provides firms and their decision-
makers considerable latitude for the interpretation of institutional pressures, which results 
in heterogeneous strategic responses among firms.   
 
4.2 Managerial Attention  
At least since Simon’s early work (1945), we have known that individuals focus 
their attention on selected aspects of a situation due to their cognitive limits. Selective 
attention thus leads to the exclusion of competing aspects, which might result in an 
alternative behavior. In this respect, “what decision-makers do depends on what issues 
and answers they focus their attention on.” (Ocasio, 1997: 186). The implication of this 
for firms is that firm behavior may as well be a function of how managers distribute their 
attention across strategic issues surrounding the firm.  
Attention, in this sense, is defined as the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and 
focusing of time and effort by organizational decision-makers (Ocasio, 1997: 189). This 
view of attention goes beyond simply paying attention to something (Levy, 2005). It is in 
fact a cognitive process with regard to managerial sensemaking. But how does attention 
affect strategic responses to institutional differences?  
As explained earlier, managers direct their attention on a limited set of elements 
of their environment. In this respect, two environmental domains are identified in the 
extant literature (Bourgeois, 1980; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008; Roth & Morrison, 1992): 
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general environment and market environment. The former is bounded by country 
parameters (Roth & Morrison, 1992), and thus includes the institutional environment, 
e.g., social norms, widely-held beliefs and taken for granted assumptions in a country 
(Scott, 1995). Market environment, on the other hand, is the typical research context in 
strategic management. It resembles the notion of industry in the industrial organization 
paradigm as it is composed of customers, suppliers, competitors, technology, and as well 
as laws and regulations (Bourgeois, 1980). Managers can narrowly focus on sectors in the 
market environment or can scan broadly across different components of the general 
environment. I argue that these attention patterns affect how managers make sense of 
institutional voids, and thus influence the firm’s strategic response to them.   
 
4.3 Hypotheses 
According to the view of attention that is adopted in this paper, attention provides 
a lens through which managers identify strategic issues and make strategic decisions 
(Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). In other words, attention is a sensemaking process through 
which managers construct a line of action for the firms they run. The implication is that 
unequal managerial attention across firms to different aspects of the environment should 
lead to different interpretations of environmental pressures, and naturally, to different 
strategic responses (Dutton & Duncan, 1987). This is the main idea of this paper.  
This idea has been supported by the empirical results. Nadkarni and Barr (2008) 
find that attention to the market environment positively affects the speed of strategic 
responses to the events in the market environment, whereas it negatively affects the speed 
of the strategic responses to the events in the general environment. Levy (2005) 
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documents that firms are more likely to develop an expansive global strategic posture 
when their top management pays attention to the external environment and considers a 
diverse set of elements in this environment. Thomas et al. (1993) report that managers 
interpret strategic issues that they pay more attention to as positive and controllable, and 
such interpretations in turn enhance the potential for top managers' taking strategic 
change actions. On the other hand, they find less attention is associated with the 
interpretation of issues as negative and uncontrollable, which in turn makes strategic 
change actions less likely. Kaplan (2008) shows that CEO attention to a new technology 
is associated with subsequent increases in a firm’s investment in that technical domain. 
D’Avenni and McMillan (1995) find that managers of successful firms attend to critical 
success factors in firm’s external environment while those of failing firms deny focusing 
on these factors and instead direct their attention to firm’s internal environment. Cho and 
Hambrick (2006) document that a shift in managerial attention caused by deregulation 
leads to a change in firm strategy.   
This literature, despite revealing the cognitive underpinnings of strategic 
responses, focuses to a large extent on the domestic and the market environment, and 
hence ignores strategic responses to the demands of the institutional environment. For a 
purely domestic firm operating in a developed country, a focus on the market 
environment may suffice to gain competitive advantage, as the prevalent bureaucratic 
logic maintains rule-based market competition. Where emerging countries are concerned, 
however, it is well established that the role of the institutional environment becomes 
conspicuous (Peng et al., 2008). Considering this, it can be argued that expansion into 
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emerging countries requires attention to different strategic issues than those required by 
domestic competition.  
In this regard, I argue that expansion into emerging countries requires managers 
to shift their attention focus from the market environment to the institutional 
environment. Absence or weakness of bureaucratic logic means that markets to work the 
same way in these countries as they do in developed countries, which reduces the 
effectiveness of market strategies (Peng, 2003). An attention focus on the institutional 
environment, in this regard, will enable managers to recognize the institutional 
differences across countries, which will make them more likely to modify their market 
strategies accordingly. As a result, they will be more likely to address the challenges 
stemming from institutional differences and hence decide to internationalize.   
In this sense, more attention to the institutional environment is associated with 
richer institutional knowledge, which allows managers to construct better interpretations 
of institutional differences and envision more alternative responses to them. On the other 
hand, more attention to the market environment, due to cognitive limits, will mean less 
attention to the institutional environment. This will translate into poor knowledge of 
patrimonial logic, which will hinder managers’ ability to develop non-market strategies 
required to respond to institutional differences. This will narrow down the opportunity set 
envisioned by managers, and hence will discourage them from expanding into emerging 
countries. Thus;  
 
Hypothesis 1: Managerial attention to the institutional environment will be 
positively related to firm expansion into emerging countries. 
 95 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Managerial attention to the market environment will be negatively 
related to firm expansion into emerging countries.  
 
On the other hand, I argue that entry into developed countries does not require 
different attention patterns than those of domestic competition. This is because a strong 
bureaucratic logic that underpins market competition is commonly shared by all 
developed countries. Although there may be differences in the “strength” of bureaucratic 
logic, “the rules of the game” do not really change when a develop country firm enters 
into another developed country. Strong bureaucratic logic, in this sense, provides a 
foundation on which a similar market competition, “the same game”, takes place. For this 
reason, managers need to focus their attention on the market environment to understand 
the industry dynamics and the formal institutional environment, and develop market 
strategies to respond to this environment. On the other hand, managers do not need to pay 
attention to the institutional environment, as it does not significantly change across 
developed countries. In short, developed country firms do not need to gain knowledge of 
patrimonial logic when they expand into another developed country. Besides, more 
attention to the institutional environment will correspond to less mental resources and 
less effort spent on analyzing the market environment, which will hinder firm’s ability to 
expand into developed countries. Thus; 
 
Hypothesis 3: Managerial attention to the market environment will be positively 
related to firm expansion into developed countries. 
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Hypothesis 4: Managerial attention to the institutional environment will be 
negatively related to firm expansion into developed countries.  
 
4.4 Methodology 
 
4.4.1 Sample 
The sample for this study was drawn from the COMPUSTAT database. Three 
criteria guided the sampling of US manufacturing firms. First, the sample was limited to 
global industries only. I drew on the extant literature to identify global industries 
(Nadkarni et al., 2011; Samiee & Roth, 1992; Zou & Cavusgil, 2002). Within such 
industries, industry structure transcends national boundaries, creating similar markets 
across countries. According to industrial organization paradigm, firms in these industries 
are under more competitive pressures and hence tend to pursue global strategies. This 
suggests that market environment should be paramount for managers of these firms if 
they are to internationalize, whereas institutional differences across countries should 
receive little or no attention as a firm is assumed to find itself in the same industry 
environment, regardless of the country it enters. However, I argue in this paper that 
industry environment is embedded in the institutional environment, and as the institutions 
of a potential host country differ from those of the home country, managers need to pay 
more attention to the institutional environment. Only then managers can make sense of 
the institutional differences and identify opportunities in an institutionally distant 
country. I contend it is this cognitive process that is the primary driver of 
internationalization choices. If the results of this study support this argument for firms in 
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global industries, then the findings can be easily generalized to firms in other industries, 
since managers in multi-domestic and transnational industries are under more pressures 
to adapt their strategies to local contexts and hence are more likely to focus their attention 
on the institutional differences between countries.  
The second criterion that guided sample selection was firm size. I chose firms 
whose sales exceeded $100 million. This reduced the amounts of missing data as there is 
little publicly available data for smaller firms. Third, because young firms are in 
transition and their cognition is unstable, I focused on firms that were at least 10 years 
old (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). These criteria yielded 152 
firms operating in 18 industries. Finally, I used data from 2004 to 2007 to measure the 
dependent variables, and one year lagged values for all independent and control variables, 
which aimed to address reverse causality issues.  
 
4.4.2 Data sources for eliciting managerial cognition 
Following the extant strategic cognition literature (Cho & Hambrick, 2006; 
Kaplan, 2008; Levy, 2005; Nadkarni & Barr, 2008), I used CEO’s letters to shareholders 
published in the annual reports to measure their attention patterns. I collected annual 
reports from Mergent Web Reports, as well as from firms’ official websites. 
A major criticism of the use of letters to shareholders is that they may be used by 
managers as tools for impression management, and thus may not reflect their cognitions. 
Yet, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), now one of the leading organizations for 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting, defines CEOs´ statements as one of the 
most important parts of the CSR reports (Castello & Lozano, 2011). As argued by the 
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GRI G3, the CEO/President’s letter reports on the organization’s strategy. Such letters 
state manager’s priorities with regard to firm’s internal and external environment, and 
how they affect firm strategy. In other words, these letters define the strategic lines of the 
firm and can in fact considered one of the most representative parts of the reports 
(Abrahamson & Amir, 1996).  
There is also plenty of evidence in the business literature suggesting that letter to 
shareholders can be a reliable data source for the measurement of managerial cognition. 
For instance, Fiol (1995) compared public and private documents generated by 
executives in the forest products industry and found that non-evaluative cognitions—
attribution of control—were significantly correlated across these two types of documents. 
D’Aveni & MacMillan (1990) similarly demonstrated that measures of top managers’ 
cognitions drawn from the letters to shareholders were highly correlated with measures 
derived from other types of data. Even in the institutional literature (in which decoupling 
is a central concept), Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) found striking correspondence 
between public and private statements of the accounting firms they studied. In short, 
statements in letters to shareholders can safely be seen as an indirect indicator of the 
cognitive representations of managers from the sample firms. 
 
4.4.3 Measuring Attention 
I obtained data regarding managerial attention patterns by using word counts from 
letters to shareholders. Word count has been employed in several studies to measure 
managerial cognition (Cho & Hambrick 2006; D’Aveni & MacMillan 1990; Kaplan, 
2008; Levy, 2005). A coding list was developed mostly from the ground up. I selected the 
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phrases and words referring to each element of the environment after manually coding 
several letters. I continued manual coding until I stopped coming across new phrases and 
words. After the coding list was complete, I used the “Text Search” option in NVivo to 
obtain the word counts for the whole sample. I used the proportion of the keywords in a 
letter to shareholder to measure how managerial attention is distributed across the firm’s 
environment. Table 4.3 shows a sample of these keywords used for automated coding. 
   
4.4.4 Independent variables 
Attention to market environment and attention to institutional environment. I drew 
on the extant frameworks of the task environment (Bourgeois, 1980; Daft et al., 1988) to 
identify the concepts related to the market environment. I classified words and phrases 
related to competitors, suppliers, customers, and the regulatory environment under the 
market environment.  
I used Scott’s (1995) and North’s (1991) framework of institutions to identify the 
words and phrases related to the institutional environment. I categorized words/phrases 
referring to social norms, ethics, corporate social responsibility, under the socio-cultural 
environment, whereas I classified the words/phrases regarding politics under the political 
environment.  
In order to calculate the proportion of the key words, I used the coverage ratio 
provided by NVivo. This ratio gives the average of the percentage of characters coded —
as text selections— and the percentage of the page area coded —as region selections—. 
Thus, this ratio provides a control for the length of the letter to shareholder.  
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4.4.5 Dependent variables 
Internationalization. The number of subsidiaries has been widely used in the 
international business literature to measure the degree of internationalization (Dau, 2013; 
Lu & Beamish, 2004; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Thus, I capture expansion into emerging 
countries with the number of subsidiaries the firm has in emerging countries, and entry 
into developed countries with the number of subsidiaries the firm has in developed 
countries. In regards to categorization of countries, there is no established convention for 
the designation of "developed" and "developing" countries or areas in the United Nations 
system. IMF’s classification of advanced economies does not seem to reflect the common 
practice, as its current grouping includes countries such as Czech Republic, Slovenia, and 
Slovakia, which have been treated as transition economies by scholars and practitioners 
alike. Therefore, I mainly use the conventional categorization of developed countries that 
consists of the U.S., Canada, Western European countries, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Japan (Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). However, I slightly modify this by moving Israel, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea to the developed country category, considering 
that they have been some of the highest income countries in the world during the past 
decade. Besides, I treat the Canadian subsidiaries of the sampled firms as domestic 
subsidiaries and thus do not include them in the measurement of the dependent variable.    
 
4.4.6 Control variables 
I controlled nine variables that are commonly known to affect 
internationalization: firm age, firm size, slack, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, 
export intensity, product diversification, firm international experience, and past 
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performance (Kirca et al., 2011; Lu & Beamish, 2004; Kim et al., 2010). Due to data 
availability issues regarding firm’s international experience, I could not use the 
conventional measure of the number of years of international investment history (Henisz 
and Delios, 2001). Therefore, I created a categorical variables to measure firm’s 
emerging country experience and firm’s overall international experience: As of 2002, if a 
firm had had a subsidiary in a foreign country; 1) for 10 years or more, the variable was 
labeled as “vast international experience”, and took the value of 2; 2) for less than 10 
years, the variable was labeled as “limited international experience” and took the value of 
1. If the firm did not have a subsidiary in a foreign country as of 2002, the variable was 
labeled as “no international experience” and took the value of 0. Similarly, if a firm had 
had a subsidiary in an emerging country as of 2002; 1) for 10 years or more, the variable 
was labeled as “vast emerging country experience”, and took the value of 2; 2) for less 
than 10 years, the variable was labeled as “limited emerging country experience” and 
took the value of 1. If the firm did not have a subsidiary in a foreign country as of 2002, 
the variable was labeled as “no emerging country experience” and took the value of 0. 
Since this study emphasizes the role of managers and their sensemaking in 
determining firm’s internationalization strategy, I also controlled for the effect of the 
manager’s background characteristics, such as prior experience in emerging countries and 
overall international experience. I defined international experience as the number of years 
spent on higher education and on work assignments abroad (Nadkarni & Perez, 2007). As 
for emerging country experience, I use a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 
CEO worked or studied in at least one of the emerging countries. I used I measured firm 
size by the logarithm of the total employees. I used the ratio of liabilities to assets to 
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measure slack. For R&D intensity, I used R&D expenditures over sales. To measure 
advertising intensity, I used the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales. I capture export 
intensity with the ratio of exports to sales. As for product diversification, I used entropy 
measure, which is calculated as: 
Degree of product diversification = ∑i [Pi x ln(l/Pi)], 
where Pi is the sales attributed to segment i and ln(l/Pi) is the weight given to each 
segment, or the natural logarithm of the inverse of its sales. Past performance was 
measured as the return on sales in the prior year. Finally, I controlled for the industry 
effects by using the two digit Standard Industry Classification Codes (SIC). In the 
sample, firms were distributed across seven industries, so I used six dummy variables. I 
derived all the firm-level data from the COMPUSTAT database, whereas I obtained the 
data regarding managerial background characteristics from Dun and Bradstreet’s 
Reference Book of Corporate Management, as well as from biographies published in 
Businessweek. 
 
4.5 Results 
The means, standard deviations, and correlations are reported in Table 4.4. To 
check for a potential problem of multicollinearity, I used variance inflation factor 
analysis. The scores ranged from 1.13 to 4.03, which was well below 10, thus 
multicollinearity was not a problem in the regression analysis (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, 
& Black, 1998).   
Table 4.5 contains the negative binomial regression results testing the hypotheses. 
Model 1 shows the effects of firm size, firm age, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, 
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slack, product diversification, export intensity, CEO international experience and past 
performance on firm expansion into developed countries, after controlling for the 7 
dummy industry variables. R&D intensity and advertising intensity, the commonly used 
proxies for market capabilities that are accepted as the primary drivers of 
internationalization in the literature (Kirca et al., 2011), have significant and positive 
effects in this model.  
In model 2, we see the effect of the same variables on firm expansion into 
emerging countries. The effects of R&D intensity and advertising intensity are again 
positive and significant, suggesting that market capabilities drive internationalization also 
into emerging countries.           
Model 3 reports tests of Hypothesis 3 and 4. In this full model, attention to market 
environment is positively related to entry into developed countries (p>0.05), which 
supports Hypothesis 3. However, the effect of attention to institutional environment is not 
significant (p<0.1). As a result, hypothesis 4, which posited a negative relationship 
between managerial attention to the institutional environment and firm entry into 
developed countries, is not supported. 
In model 4, attention to institutional environment is positively related to firm 
expansion into emerging countries (p<0.05), which provides support for hypothesis 1. 
The effect of attention to market environment is, however, not significant (p<0.05). As a 
result, hypothesis 2, which predicted a negative relationship between attention to market 
environment and entry into emerging countries, is not supported.  
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4.6. Discussion  
At least since Oliver’s (1991) seminal work, institutional scholars have known 
that organizations engage in active and interest-seeking behavior in response to 
institutional pressures. In other words, organizations can develop strategic responses to 
these pressures rather than passively yielding to institutional pressures in a uniform 
manner. This approach was a significant contribution to the earlier versions of 
institutional theory, because it explained the heterogeneity in organizational behavior 
despite the pressures for conformity and homogeneity. However, since this perspective 
treats the nature and the context of the institutional pressures as the main determinant of 
strategic responses, it does not address how organizations that are subject to identical 
pressures vary in their responses.  
The objective of this study is to address this void in the literature by highlighting 
the role of individual sensemaking in determining organization’s strategic responses to 
dissimilar institutional logics. By directly examining the cognitive processes through 
which managers make sense of their environment, I show that institutional differences 
between countries do not automatically lead to a choice between internationalization and 
no internationalization. The pressures stemming from institutional pressures are rather 
interpreted, given meaning, and responded to by the key decision makers of organizations 
(Dacin et al., 2002; George et al., 2006). In this regard, theory and findings of this study 
provide evidence supporting the theoretical arguments of the current work in institutional 
research, which views sensemaking at the individual level is a source of agency, as well 
as the main reason behind the heterogeneous strategic responses (George et al., 2006; 
Kennedy & Fiss, 2009; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Powell & Colyvas, 2008). 
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Another contribution of this paper to institutional theory is its approach to 
uncertainty caused by weak bureaucratic logic. Since Meyer and Rowan (1977), 
institutional scholars have equated underdeveloped formal institutions with weaker 
pressures for conformity. Oliver (1991) similarly proposed that organizations will resist 
institutional pressures when the level of institutionalization is low. However, some recent 
institutional research has come to view the lack of institutionalization in emerging 
countries as an opportunity for more active institutional strategies, even for institutional 
entrepreneurship (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009, Tracey & Phillips, 2011). In this 
respect, firm expansion from a developed country to an emerging country provides a 
different context to analyze organizations’ strategic responses to dissimilar institutional 
logics. It shows that organizations can take advantage of the weak bureaucratic logic only 
if their decision-makers have the sensemaking capabilities to navigate through an 
institutional system dominated by patrimonial logic.  
This work follows in the footsteps of George et al. (2006) and Kennedy and Fiss 
(2009), who drew on upper echelon theory and threat-rigidity hypothesis (Staw et al., 
1981) to extend Oliver’s (1991) model of strategic responses to institutional pressures. 
Integrating neo-institutional theory with cognitive science, this study provides a new 
conceptualization of the relationship between institutional distance and 
internationalization strategy. It offers a fresh perspective in studying internationalization 
by emphasizing the special role of managerial cognition in mitigating the difficulties 
arising from institutional differences.    
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4.7 Implications and further research 
There is a general understanding among economists that internationalization 
(FDI) happens when firms (investors) feel secure, but we do not really know what makes 
them feel secure (Rodrik, 2006). This study can also be seen as an attempt to address this 
issue. In this regard, further research should study other cognitive processes than 
attention that shapes the way firms make sense of institutional differences, as well as how 
this sensemaking influences their subsequent action. Only then can we understand the 
real dynamics and processes of internationalization.  
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In this study, I drew on Xu and Shenkar (2002) and Phillips et al. (2009) to study 
internationalization as a strategic response to institutional differences between home and 
host countries. However, I integrated this line of work with the recent developments in 
institutional research that studies cognition as the micro-foundation of institutions 
(George et al., 2006; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). By directly examining managerial 
sensemaking through attention focus, this study explains why there is a diversity of 
strategic responses among developed country firms to the patrimonial logic prevalent in 
emerging countries. The findings support the hypothesis that managerial attention to the 
market environment is positively related to firm expansion into developed countries, 
whereas, managerial attention to the institutional environment is positively related to firm 
expansion into emerging countries. I thus conclude that the variation in managerial 
attention focus on market and institutional environments is the cognitive underpinning of 
strategic responses to dissimilar institutional logics. 
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Table 4.1: Firm’s external environment 
Market Environment General Environment 
Competitors Demographic Environment 
Customers Macro-Economic Environment 
Suppliers Socio-Cultural Environment 
Legal/Regulative Environment Political Environment 
 
        Institutional Environment 
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Table 4.2: Global industries in which sampled firms operate 
SIC Code Industry 
2086 Bottled & canned drinks 
2100 Soft drinks & carbonated water 
2834 Pharmaceuticals 
2844 Cosmetics 
3533 Oil Field Machinery 
3562 Ball and roller bearings 
3570 Computers & office equipment 
3571 Electronic computers 
3577 Computer peripheral equipment 
3651 Household audio and video equipment 
3674 Semiconductors 
3711 Automobiles 
3714 Automotive parts 
3721 Aircraft 
3728 Aircraft parts 
3844 X-Ray apparatus 
3845 Electromedical apparatus 
3861 Photographic equipment 
3873 Watches and clocks 
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Table 4.3: Samples of keywords used for automated coding 
Market Environment Institutional Environment 
Competitors Customers Suppliers Legal/ 
Regulative 
Socio-Cultural Political 
Competitor Customer Supplier Law Ethics Government 
 
Acquisition 
 
Market 
 
Supply chain 
 
Regulation 
 
Corporate 
citizenship  
 
State agencies 
 
Barriers to 
entry 
 
Consumer 
 
Raw material 
 
Legislation 
 
Social 
responsibility 
 
Policymakers 
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Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Summary statistics for the industry, CEO emerging country experience, and firm international experience variables are not included to 
save space.  
N= 423. * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.  Entry into 
developed countries 
10.12 18.99             
2. Entry into 
emerging countries 
  4.53 10.89   0.92***            
3. Firm age 30.41 15.94   0.49***   0.47***           
4. Firm size   1.69   1.66   0.62***   0.56***   0.63***          
5. R&D intensity   0.11   0.15 –0.01 –0.02 –0.21*** –0.13**         
6. Advertising 
intensity 
  0.02   0.04   0.09*   0.13** –0.04 –0.00 –0.06        
7. Slack   0.49   0.29   0.09*   0.09*   0.18***   0.33*** –0.07   0.38***       
8. Past performance   0.11   0.15   0.11**   0.11**   0.21***   0.18*** –0.35***   0.07 –0.22***      
9. Product 
diversification 
  0.33   0.45  0.28***   0.22***   0.32***   0.30** –0.14** –0.13**   0.05   0.04     
10. Export intensity   0.02   0.09 –0.04 –0.07 –0.08 –0.06   0.00 –0.04 –0.12**   0.11* –0.03    
11. CEO international 
experience 
  1.98   5.29   0.16***   0.15***   0.06   0.13**   0.15***   0.01   0.03   0.08 –0.00 –0.07   
12. CEO attention to 
inst. environment 
  0.09   0.15   0.27***   0.26***   0.21***   0.34*** –0.05   0.02   0.17***   0.05   0.04 –0.01 0.02  
13. CEO attention to 
market environment 
  1.69   1.48   0.01   0.02 –0.07 –0.01   0.16*** –0.06 –0.04 –0.00   0.03 –0.01 0.00 –0.00 
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Table 4.5: Results of analyses of managerial attention focus on internationalization 
choices 
 
Independent 
Variables  
Model 1 
Entry into 
developed 
countries  
Model 2 
Entry into 
emerging 
countries  
Model 3 
Entry into  
developed 
countries  
Model 4 
Entry into  
emerging 
countries  
Intercept  3.47***   4.49***  3.14***   4.29***  
Firm age   1.85***   1.69***   1.87***  1.65***  
Firm size   4.23***   5.14***   4.12***   5.15***  
R&D intensity   1.43***   0.58*   1.27***   0.42  
Advertising intensity   0.67***   0.79***   0.68***   0.77***  
Slack  -0.39*   0.06  -0.39   0.67  
Past performance   1.50***   0.28   1.44***   0.15  
Export intensity  0.14  -0.01   0.09  -0.04  
Product diversification -0.24***   0.18***  -0.27***   0.17***  
CEO international 
experience 
 1.23***   0.68***   1.23***   0.62***  
CEO attention to 
market environment  
   0.76***   0.17  
CEO attention to 
institutional 
environment  
   0.19   0.65*  
N  425  423  425  423  
    *p < 0.05 
  **p < 0.01 
***p < 0.001 
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